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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Cristin R. Mandaville for the Master of Science 
in Geography presented November 21, 1995. 
Title: A Swamp in the Desert: Theory, Water Policy, and Malheur Lake 
Basin 
Two perspectives are debated in current United States water policy 
model development. One perspective calls for policy based on normative 
values, such as an environmental ethic. The second perspective calls for 
policy based on empirical, quantifiable values, for instance, economic 
benefits and costs. This theoretical debate arises from differing assumptions 
about what is problematic in contemporary water policy, and in turn gives 
rise to many water policy models. Developing such models ostensibly 
provides frameworks useful for developing real-world water policies. This 
paper proposes that these water policy models are not in fact useful 
frameworks for policy applications because the models do not accurately 
account for the actual circumstances confronting water policy makers. In 
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order to illustrate this hypothesis, a comparison of two water policy models 
with a set of real-world policy circumstances is made here. 
The two models, each representing one of the dominant theoretical 
perspectives, are taken from David Lewis Feldman's Water resources 
manaiement: In search of an environmental ethic (1991) and Peter Rogers' 
America's water: Federal roles and responsibilities (1993). Feldman's model 
was selected to represent the normative perspective, and Rogers' model is 
selected to represent the empirical perspective. The real-world water policy 
circumstances selected for this study are those of Malheur Lake Basin, 
Oregon. This basin was selected because it provides the opportunity to 
consider a range of water policy issues and problems. This study shows that 
these two models do not offer adequate frameworks for applications. If 
water policy models are to provide useful frameworks for applications, 
model development must more closely consider actual cases. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty has been a central concern in United States water policy 
history (Holmes 1972; Holmes 1979). The desire to include a measure of 
certainty in policy has led to policy model development. Two perspectives 
have dominated this model development, particularly in contemporary 
debate. One perspective advocates policy based on normative values, such 
as a social contract based on an environmental ethic. The second perspective 
calls for policy based on empirical values, for instance multi-objective plans 
based on quantitative assessments of benefits and costs. The models are 
based on differing assumptions about what is problematic in water policy. 
This paper hypothesizes that water policy models do not provide 
particularly useful frameworks for actual policy development, and that this 
is because the models do not accurately represent the circumstances of the 
real world. 
This paper indicates that neither of the approaches evaluated herein 
can be applied to actual water policy cases. Elements from both models are 
found in the case studied, but the analysis indicates that even if the models 
were fully applied they would not result in achieving their stated objectives 
in this case or elsewhere. Further, both models overlook factors critical to 
water policy. In particular, the models fail to address crucial physical, 
political, and legal factors in actual water policy. These failures are 
illustrated by the circumstances of the case studied. Unless water policy 
model development is made useful, the value of its continued debate is 
questionable. 
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Both Feldman and Rogers define "water policy" as the entire complex 
of policies, plans, rules, and factors involved in water resources use and 
management. This definition is used in examining the case of Malheur Lake 
Basin (the "Basin") as well. The major factors involved in Basin water policy 
are considered in evaluating the Basin case. 
THE MODELS 
David Lewis Feldman's (1991) Water resources management: In 
search of an environmental ethic and Peter Rogers' (1993) America's water: 
Federal roles and responsibilities provide the models considered in this 
paper. Both perspectives are concerned with several common water 
resources problems, such as water quality protection and equitable 
distribution of the resource and the benefits produced by it. Both authors 
are also concerned with broader policy problems, including an abundance of 
involved institutions, regional administration, and intergovernmental 
relations. Both focus on the United States, and include discussions of 
economics, law, and politics in their models. 
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Nonetheless, the models are framed by the authors' very different 
perspectives, and are based on very different assumptions of policy problems 
and of what makes good policy. The normative perspective, represented in 
this study by Feldman's model, calls for a broad-based social acceptance of 
uncertainty regarding nature and natural values. The value of water must 
be assumed to be inherent, rather than assigned by society, and greater 
than its value as a commodity. Good water policy interferes minimally with 
the natural hydrologic cycle. Social equity is also inherently valuable in this 
perspective. The administrative system Feldman proposes consists of a 
national system of decentralized regional water authorities, controlled 
locally and based on watersheds. 
The empirical perspective, represented in this study by Rogers' 
model, focuses on accounting for that which is known. Good water policy 
must consider water a commodity. Water distribution should be managed 
through market-based strategies to ensure balance in fiscal budgets and in 
water supply and demand. Environmental impacts of water policy should be 
considered in terms of quantifiable values, benefits, and costs. Rogers 
proposes establishing central federal authority over regional water 
administrations. 
MALHEUR LAKE BASIN 
A watershed basin in southeastern Oregon provides the case study 
examined in this paper. The watershed is Malheur Lake Basin, as defined 
by Oregon State Water Resources Department. Malheur Lake Basin 
("Basin") water policy circumstances include a variety of physical and 
human factors, some of which are unique to the Basin and some of which 
can be generalized to other locations and situations. The factors considered 
in this study are not limited to those that parallel the factors addressed in 
the models. Instead, water policy in this Basin is described in terms of the 
concerns that dominate water resources and policy debates in the Basin. 
In the Basin, water policy is determined by a few primary players 
based on certain assumptions. Agents with roles in determining water 
policy include federal agencies, Oregon, consumers, and private interests. 
Two broad interests, based on water usage, dominate Basin water policy. 
First, there exists within the Basin an interest in maintaining current 
economic, largely agricultural, activities and levels of productivity. Second, 
there is an interest in preserving and improving a large area of the Basin 
for wildlife habitat. The economy of the Basin is dominated by cattle 
4 
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ranching, which is generally considered to affect water quality and 
wetlands' habitats negatively (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). At the 
same time, both residents and non-residents value the Basin wetlands and 
wildlife highly. These apparently opposing values developed over the history 
of European occupation of the basin. These assumptions sometimes lead to 
conflicts over water policy. 
Controversy over grazing, the condition of public rangelands, and the 
effects on water quality began shortly after the arrival of the first ranchers 
in 1868. Early settlers came in the 1870s to claim portions of the then vast 
grassland valleys. The greatest influx of settlers to the Basin, largely 
consisting of ranchers, occurred in the 1880s. By the turn of the century, the 
grasslands were dramatically degraded. Progressive Era conservationism, 
however, and concern for game and other migratory water birds, led to the 
establishment of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in 1908. The area of the 
refuge was expanded in 1935 and again in 1941, and presently encompasses 
about 184,000 acres of wetlands. 
An interior drainage basin in a semi-arid region, the Basin provides 
the opportunity to consider a wide range of water resources supply and 
demand issues, including floods and water shortages, agricultural 
productivity, and wildlife habitat preservation. The area often experiences 
both water shortages and flooding within a single water year or over several 
years. Ground water provides an important resource for the wetlands and 
municipal and domestic water supplies. 
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The key agents administering water policy in the Basin include three 
federal agencies - the United States Forest Service ("USFS"), Bureau of 
Land Management ("BLM"), and Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") - and 
the State of Oregon. These are key agents because the federal agents own 
extensive land in the Basin, the USFWS holds senior water rights, and 
Oregon owns the water resources in the state. 
Federal lands include rangelands (managed primarily by the BLM), 
forests (managed by the USFS), and wildlife refuges (managed by the 
USFWS). Local consumers generally value both the rangelands and the 
refuges highly. Thus, federal interests vary along the same lines as local, 
private interests. The roles of local jurisdictions in directly shaping water 
policy are minimal because of the state's authority over water and land use 
decisions, and the degree of federal land ownership. Therefore, local 
jurisdictions are not considered in this study. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Until the 1950s, U. S. water policy emphasized large water projects 
and structural basin development. This is generally considered to have 
undermined broad-based national interests and long-term sustainability of 
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water supplies (Gottleib 1988; Mann 1975; Maass 1951; North, et al. 1981; 
Reisner 1986). Since the 1950s, an emphasis on improving water 
administration by increasing quantitative certainty coincided with an 
increasing concern with water quality and aquatic ecosystem health (Carson 
1962; Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963; Cohon 1978; Eckstein 1958; Hanke and Davis 
1973; James and Lee 1971; Maass, et al. 1962; Moore 1988; Moreell 1956; 
Welsh 1985; White 1969; Wolman and Bonem 1971). 
More recently, water policy models are recommended as a means of 
preserving overall environmental quality, protecting biodiversity regionally, 
and distributing an important resource equitably (Anderson 1983; Doppelt, 
et al. 1993; Feldman 1991; Kellert, et al. 1991; National Research Council 
1992; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1989; 
Reisner and Bates 1990; Rogers 1993). The specifics of these models differ, 
but all call for increased public participation, for regional administration of 
water resources, and for better coordination of objectives and methods 
among agencies and organizations within and between water resources 
regions. 
Geographers involved in water policy modeling have included Gilbert 
F. White, who, among his many endeavors, presented a classification of 
strategies of United State water policy (White 1969), considered recent 
wetlands policy developments (White 1991), and modeled the environmental 
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impacts of the Aswan Dam (White 1988). Mathews (1984) applied 
geographic analysis to a consideration of water resources and law. Regional 
approaches have also played a role in geographers' analyses of water 
resources (Muckleston 1990; Sewell 1965; White 1986). Wilkinson (1990) 
modeled a water policy with a humanist approach for improving degraded 
western lands. Water management and administration with a demand 
management approach was modeled by Platt (1993), who also considered a 
demand management approach as applied by Massachusetts (1995). 
Water policy models are currently developed within the context of a 
debate over two perspectives. The normative perspective calls for ideological 
consistency of and between water resources laws, institutions, and activities 
(Anderson 1983; Feldman 1991; Doppelt, et al. 1993; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 1989). Generally, this perspective 
also advocates decentralization. Feldman's normative perspective follows 
this tradition. 
The empirical perspective claims to be based on feasibility (Rogers 
1993; National Research Council 1992; North, et al. 1981). This perspective 
relies heavily on economic assessment and market forces, and yet also 
typically calls for strong central authority over the various interests in 
water policy. Rogers' perspective is in alignment with this tradition. 
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Models considered but not selected for this study were rejected on 
various grounds. Anderson's (1983) model was deselected because it has 
been over a decade since its publication. White's (1969) classification 
scheme, though was rejected also for its publication date. Sewell's (1965) 
study of floods and the Frasier River Basin was not considered for this study 
because of the publication date. The criterion for selection of a recently 
published model was based on the intent to critique the current state of 
affairs within the water policy model debate. 
Other models were rejected primarily based on the criteria of 
geographic scale and topical scope. The models selected for this study were 
required to address U. S. water policy comprehensively. Several models 
were rejected for their narrow scale or scope, including White's (1988) 
consideration of the Aswan Dam, Mathews (1984) consideration of 
geography and water law, Wilkinson's (1990) consideration of Western U.S. 
water resources concerns, and the National Research Council's (1990) model 
for improving the quality of aquatic ecosystems. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development proposal for integrated, watershed-
based water administration was rejected because of its wide geographic and 
topical focus on a variety of international issues (1989). 
Studies of Malheur Lake Basin water resources issues have focused 
primarily on specialized scientific topics and the history of the ranching 
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industry (Anonymous 1902; Brimlow 1951; French 1964; Fuste and , 
McKenzie 1987; Horton, et al. 1983; Hubbard 1975; Hubbard 1989; Paulson, 
et al. 1991; Piper 1939; Rinella and Schuler 1992; Simpson 1987; U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers 1987; Vorderstrasse and Garst 1987). Fewer 
studies have directly considered water resources policy and management 
concerns (Duebbert 1969; Klingeman, et al. 1971; Reinhardt 1992). 
The State Water Resources Board's Malheur Lake Basin Report 
(1967) and Biennial Report (Oregon Water Resources Department 1992), 
Oregon's Water Rights Systems (Oregon Water Resources Department 1994), 
and the Strategic Water Management Plan (Oregon Water Resources 
Department 1995) provide the background for the description of state water 
policy in this paper. 
Land use plans and program documents provide the background for 
federal water policy. The wildlife refuge documents include plans for Hart 
Mountain Antelope Refuge and Malheur Wildlife Refuge (Franklin, et al. 
1972; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1982; 1985; 1990; 1992; 1994). The 
largest area of land is managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Plans 
and information regarding BLM holdings and programs are also considered 
(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1982; 1986; 1989; 1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 
1993b; 1993c). The most recent public forest plans, though less important 
for water policy in the basin than either the USFWS or the BLM documents, 
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are also considered herein (U.S. Forest Service 1991). Typically, the USFS 
and BLM interests regarding water tend to coincide, in favor of protecting 
economic productivity, and are in opposition to the USFWS, which favors 
protecting the environment. 
POLICY MODELS VERSUS REAL-WORLD POLICY 
As both Feldman (1991) and Rogers (1993) state, the best indication 
of success in policy models is to be found in examinations of actual policy 
cases. However, this study suggests that the model development debate 
does not offer frameworks useful for actual policy applications. In order to 
provide a framework useful for real-world policy applications, a water policy 
model would need to offer concrete and practical strategies for improving 
unpon existing policy. A useful model would encompass many of the general 
factors involved in actual water policy situations. Broadly, such a model 
would provide feasible strategies for water distribution, use, and hazard 
mitigation. Determining feasibility would require a comprehensive 
consideration of existing constraints on water resources. While a useful 
model might consider issues including social equity or federal authority, it 
would also include consideration of physical, political, and legal 
circumstances. As indicated by the models considered herein, models which 
overlook these circumstances or which are not feasible give existing 
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constraints are not useful for applications. If water policy modeling is to do 
more that perpetuate a theoretical debate, justify certain jobs, and leverage 
certain political and academic platforms, it must bridge the gap between 
theory and application. 
CHAPl'ERII 
TWO WATER POLICY MODELS 
METHODOLOGY 
Three steps comprise this study. First, the two opposing models are 
described in terms of specific assumptions, objectives, and methods. Second, 
a case in water policy is described in terms of its assumptions, objectives, 
and methods. Finally, the terms of the models are compared to the terms of 
the case in order to analyze the applicability of the models to the case. This 
comparison is qualitative. 
The criteria for selecting these models included the representation of 
either the normative or the empirical perspective and fairly recent 
publication. The criteria also required certain similarities between the 
models, such as a national scale and attention to the concept of regional 
management. These criteria were established in order to facilitate the 
comparison to actual water policy circumstances. Malheur Lake Basin was 
selected based on criteria including: existing water policy concerns, 
representation ofU. S. water policy interests in the form of federal agencies, 
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representation of state and local interests, and a regional approach to water 
resources planning and management. 
TWO WATER POLICY MODELS 
Feldman and Rogers developed their models for water policy based on 
how they each perceive contemporary water policy and on what they each 
believe is the fundamental cause of water policy problems. Based on their 
assumptions, Feldman and Rogers develop frameworks for improving water 
policy, including specific objectives and methods for implementation. They 
each claim that implementing their respective policy models will lead to 
more socially-beneficial outcomes than are found in existing policy. 
Although each author explicitly grounds his model in a philosophical 
perspective, each also focuses on a primary question that is essentially 
geographic. In debating questions about normative versus empirical 
perspectives in water policy, they both consider what scales are best for 
water administration. Feldman recommends increased pluralism in U.S. 
water policy, and Rogers recommends centralization. Both recommend 
regional administration of water, under jurisdictions other than the states. 
In order to compare the models with Malheur Lake Basin, it is necessary to 
distill the key components of each: assumptions, objectives, and methods. 
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FELDMAN'S WATER POLICY MODEL 
Assumptions 
Feldman identifies the fundamental cause of problems in water 
resources policy as capitalism (Figure 1). His assumption is that capitalism 
defines a normative, socio-political ethic that is inherently detrimental to 
humans and their environment. The ethic of capitalism rests on core values 
"antithetical to conservation and preservation" (Feldman 1991, p. 205). 
Feldman believes capitalist motives impede individual, social, and natural 
teleological development. Such values, according to Feldman, include a 
commoditization of nature, an assumption of humanity's right to exploit 
nature, and unlimited individual freedoms: "[t]he ... willingness to rank 
individual economic liberty ... above the broad range of human needs" 
(Feldman 1991, p. 15) obviates the development of harmony within society 
and between society and nature. 
Economics. One primary outcome of the capitalist ethic is that 
frequently the market is presumed to be the best means of making political 
decisions. Policy that results from the behavior of the market does not 
consider "non-economic values, ... local concerns and tradition, ... 
promises made to regions and ... the impact of policy upon present and 
future generations" (Feldman 1991, p. 2). Feldman contends that a water 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Capitalism Is the root cause of water policy problems. 
ECONOMICS 
- Market does not make best policy decisions 
- Public Involvement Is restricted by market 
- Benefits and costs not distributed equitably by market 
LAW 
Water rights are property rights, preventing: 
- Balanced supply and demand 
- Protection of ground water 
- Water rights transfers 
POLITICS 
- Narrow Interests are represented 
- Decision-making Is Inconsistent 
- Accountability Is lacking 
OBJECTIVES 
Replace capitalist ethic with an environmental ethic, 
providing rules for: 
- Fair and equitable use 
- Full payment for use 
- Use that does not result In harm 
METHODS 
Increase pluralism 
- Create polltlcal-hydrologlc regional (watershed) 
administrations 
- Establish structural efficiency rule 
- Include representation of all Interests 
- Require payments to be In proportion to benefits 
Gain broad-based acceptance of social contract 
- Based on decision-making rules, not end-states 
- Formalizing prlnclples of the environmental ethic 
Figure 1. Feldman's water policy model. 
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policy based on market forces inevitably encompasses only narrow interests. 
Such policy does not satisfy a criterion of justice, and promotes only the 
pre-existing preferences of engineers, planners, and water resource 
beneficiaries. 
Related to the public faith in market-driven decisions is confidence in 
the use of benefit-cost analyses for measuring the efficiency of policies. 
Feldman finds the prevailing concepts of efficiency, and the use ofbenefit-
cost analysis to justify and support these concepts, troubling. Benefit-cost 
analyses lead to several specific problems. First, they are intended for use in 
comparing and evaluating policy alternatives. Feldman claims that 
development and consideration of such alternatives rarely occurs in reality. 
Second, only a few dominant interests are represented, both in the 
conducting and accounting of such analyses. Third, the criterion of 
structural efficiency, which requires that the benefit of one person does not 
result in harm to another person, is rarely considered. Benefit-cost analysis 
is problematic because it "inadequately accounts for environmental impact 
and ... it ignores the range of concerns people have about the uses of 
natural resources" (Feldman 1991, p. 6). 
By failing to consider structural efficiency and to transcend market 
forces, water policy that is rooted in capitalism derives short-term benefits 
for limited interests, claims Feldman. The existing system obscures rather 
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than elucidates the whole public interest, and is both exploitative and 
inequitable. There is no incentive in the existing system to pursue less 
costly (in terms of both economic and non-economic costs of exploitative use) 
and more equitable water policy alternatives, alleges Feldman. Distributive 
politics and the use of water resources to develop regional economies, 
through regional water projects, embody this approach to water policy. In 
addition to regional inequities, such projects intend to optimize economic 
efficiency, not structural efficiency, by developing multiple-use objectives. 
These multiple uses, however, only address the particular interests of 
certain beneficiaries, rather than the interests of all those responsible for 
paying for, or otherwise incurring a loss due to, the construction of the 
projects. 
Law. Founding water policy on capitalism and its ethical principles 
affects realms beyond merely the economic. Expressing this ethic in the 
application of property rights to water becomes problematic in riparian and 
appropriative systems alike, and is particularly thorny in ground water law. 
The property rights approach to water law leads to many outcomes, few of 
which encourage conservative use or equitable distribution of the resource 
or the benefits derived from the resource. 
Feldman alleges there are three primary failures of the property 
rights systems of water law. First, supply and demand, the physical 
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attributes of water available for use and water used, are not balanced. 
Second, ground water is not adequately protected. Feldman does not 
mention that ground water laws evolved prior to scientific understanding of 
the resource, and thus overlooks that this failure might be one of science or 
policy rather than oflaw. The third failure of water law is that water rights 
transfers are not typically feasible. The legal failures, claims Feldman, are 
exacerbated by the "fragmentation of authority" and legal rules, which 
differ from state to state (Feldman 1991, p. 27). 
The failure of water law systems to balance use and availability 
results from a fallacy that water supplies for multiple concurrent uses are 
available (Feldman 1991). Thus, according to Feldman, while the economics 
of water rest on the assumption that markets are good decision-makers, the 
law of water assumes water supplies are fairly abundant, renewable, and 
available for many simultaneous uses. Doctrines of reasonable and · 
beneficial use, and correlative rights, do not overcome discrepancies 
between use and availability, claims Feldman. These legal principles are 
limited due to monitoring problems, unclear definitions of the reasonable 
and beneficial use doctrines, and the highly competitive environment 
surrounding the water rights systems. Monitoring problems are not detailed 
by Feldman, but might be assumed to include the lack of measurement of 
the use and waste of water, such as water metering. 
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The second failure of water law lies in ground water rules that are 
based on the premise that ownership of an area of land means ownership of 
that land surface and of everything under it. This leads to what is called the 
'power of the pump,' whereby landowners pump as much ground water as 
they can with whatever size of pump they buy. This is now tempered in 
some states by doctrines of reasonable use and correlative rights, or by 
appropriative permitting rules for ground water in some cases. Reasonable 
use and correlative rights doctrines limit each individual's use by 
disallowing harm to neighboring water users' and may allow water use only 
in proportion to the area of land owned. As with prior appropriation systems 
oflaw, a few states (including Oregon) require permits to use ground water, 
with some uses (domestic or stock watering) excluded. These permits are 
issued according to roughly the same principles as surface water rights 
under prior appropriation. Feldman argues ground water laws, nonetheless, 
rarely foster equitability and generally prevent protection of aquifers from 
overdrafts and contamination. 
Finally, neither riparian nor appropriative systems provide adequate 
standards and rules for the legal transfer of water rights. Typically, water 
rights are legally transferable only with the sale of the land to which they 
are tied, either by geography (under riparian systems) or by permit (under 
prior appropriation systems). This failure of water law is illustrated by two 
21 
specific problems with prior appropriation systems, claims Feldman. Under 
drought conditions, junior appropriators receive no water while senior 
appropriators receive full allocations, which is a social inequality inherent 
to the system. Further, there is a disincentive for conservative use under 
appropriative systems due to the so-called 'use-it or lose-it' doctrine. 
Effectively, this is a statute of limitations on the non-use of a water right, 
and after a certain period of non-use transpires, the water right reverts to 
the state. This encourages water rights holders to use all of their allocated 
water, even if not needed, in order to retain the valuable right. This also 
discourages conservation and equitable distribution. 
Thus, Feldman contends, due to these failures of a water law founded 
on principles of private property, and based on the capitalist ethic, equitable 
and sustainable uses of water are prevented rather than encouraged. 
Specifically, water use exceeds availability, ground water quality and 
quantity declines, and water rights are not easily transferable to allow for 
redistribution in times of shortages, excesses, or to achieve alternate 
preferred objectives. 
Politics. Feldman describes many problematic outcomes of capitalist 
water policy in the political arena. These outcomes include: exclusion of 
certain interests from decision-making, ad hoc decision-making, a lack of 
coherency in policy, a lack of accountability for policy, and a proliferation of 
self-interested institutions. Because they are inherent in the existing 
capitalist structure, Feldman does not think that even major institutional 
reforms can resolve or improve these situations. 
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The form of democracy that results from the capitalist ethic, which 
Feldman criticizes, is characterized by numerous competitive, self-
interested groups, and a popularly-held belief that this method of decision-
making (as with market forces) leads to preferable results. The political 
arena assumes participants are defending and trading-off preferences. The 
actual result, says Feldman, is a "politically narrow struggle for 
bureaucratic survival and interest group aggrandizement" (Feldman 1991, 
p.3). The process excludes, obscures, and marginalizes the true, broad-based 
public interest, entrenches participants in narrow agendas, and does not 
allow the consideration of a wide range of policy alternatives. 
Feldman further points to the ad hoc nature of policy as being one 
problematic result of an assumption of capitalism. Situations that are 
visible and promoted by vocal, politically-prominent, interests receive 
attention. Decisions are typically justified by utilitarian criteria: the most 
benefit for the most people at the least economic cost and in the shortest 
time. However, argues Feldman, long-range planning, which considers non-
economic values and broad public interests, is not a part of this ad hoc type 
of decision-making (Feldman 1991, p. 7). Comprehensive planning may be 
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more coherent, Feldman concedes. However, the historically dominant 
method of addressing water-related concerns has been without "regard to 
systematically established national priorities based upon a political theory 
of the environment" (Feldman 1991, p. 10). Without such grounding in a 
political theory of the environment, and domination instead by a capitalist 
ethic, most comprehensive planning efforts have failed to improve upon ad 
hoc planning, Feldman believes. 
The same forces that prevent the installation of coherency in water 
resources policy prevent the designation of responsibility and enforcement 
of obligations by beneficiaries to compensate non-beneficiaries for losses and 
impacts. There is no obligation for the beneficiaries of water resources 
policies to be accountable for impacts to human and environmental needs 
outside their narrow interests. Feldman believes that not only should 
beneficiaries be obligated to repay benefactors, but also that it is not 
justifiable for individuals "to refuse to allow the needs of society to restrict 
their use of certain resources" (Feldman 1991, p.14). 
Feldman also argues that there are simply too many institutions 
involved in water resources, each with different interests and jurisdictions, 
leading to fragmented, over-lapping authority, constituency-based decision-
making, and a bureaucratic goal of institutional survival. These institutions 
include agencies at all levels of government. Any policy-making or 
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politically influential organization is also a candidate for this group. These 
institutions construct a culture of experts, such as engineers and 
economists, and base decisions on expert-opinions, further obviating public 
participation. Public participation is sacrificed, and public interest obscured, 
by the proliferation of these institutions on the political landscape. 
The false beliefthat institutional reforms will lead to improved policy 
is coupled with the problems of numerous involved institutions, claims 
Feldman. Interagency conflicts continue when reorganization is attempted, 
because the values of organizational members do not change with 
centralization, consolidation, or coordination. Feldman believes that 
differences are intensified when efforts are made to achieve consensus 
through reforms or mandates. Feldman asks whether institutional reform 
and increased consensus will provide the most flexibility and innovation in 
policy development. 
Objectives and Methods 
An alternative to the capitalist ethic forms the foundation of 
Feldman's objectives and methods. This alternative is an environmental 
ethic, and the basic objectives of this ethic are: 
... (1) the rights of users to fair and equal use of the water, (2) 
the interdependency of natural resources, based upon the 
character and disposition of these resources in a region as well 
as historical patterns of development, and (3) the obligations of 
users to abide by the rules for allocation of water and of the 
costs of locating, supplying, cleaning and transporting water ... 
. (4) No change in use, allocation, or development would be 
permitted unless it could be demonstrated that the change that 
makes some members of society better off would not make 
others, whether in the same or another water resources region, 
worse off (Feldman 1991, p. 196). 
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The main impediment Feldman identifies to the development of a normative 
environmental ethic is the pre-existing normative capitalist ethic that 
encourages the view of water as a commodity with a primary value in 
advancing individuals' and civilizations' wealth. 
Feldman's believes that establishing an ethically defensible natural 
resources policy is a crucial task facing society. Further, Feldman states 
that: 
... an ethically defensible natural resources policy is one that 
satisfies a broad range of human needs, from survival and 
biological exigency to an enlightened existence in harmony 
with one's inner character, with others, and with nature. 
Implicit in the assumption is that a theory of justice should 
encompass natural resources as well as people ... In order to 
ensure the satisfaction of this range of human needs, the 
teleological development of people requires an enlightened 
regard for the distribution, use, and potential for abuse of 
natural resources. In addition, nature is intrinsically valuable 
in its own right because of its own telos, or purpose. Every 
natural resource has a place in the unity and order of the 
physical world (Feldman 1991, p. 21-22). 
Water policy should account for both environmental and social costs 
incurred by water use and management as well as represent all possible 
interests. Feldman leaves many terms undefined. For instance, what he 
means by "enlightened," or the "needs" of humanity and nature for 
teleological development, is not clear. 
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Feldman's model poses four objectives of such an ethically defensible 
water policy and two primary methods for achieving these objectives. 
Increasing pluralism is the first method, and this consists of establishing a 
viable administrative system ofpolitical-hydrologic regions. The second 
method, establishing a social contract, provides rules and procedures of 
decision-making. 
Feldman credits Gilbert White with the idea that flexibility and 
innovation are fostered in an environment rife with opposing views and 
interests. He expands on this idea with the claim that flexibility, 
experiment, and innovation are encouraged with a high degree of 
administrative pluralism. Feldman believes that it is not contradictory to 
both increase pluralism and establish a normative, environmental ethic. In 
fact, he believes his normative ethic would nurture pluralism, unlike the 
capitalist ethic. Specifically, Feldman recommends creating regional 
political-hydrological administrations with rules and decision-making 
procedures and authority. These would replace existing state systems of 
water law and administration. Replacing existing state systems of water 
law, Feldman believes, would resolve the failures he perceives in those 
systems. 
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Feldman proposes the division of political-hydrologic regions based on 
watershed basins, with boundaries and sizes defined with a consideration of 
both cultural and natural factors. These regions would necessarily provide 
for inclusion and expression of a wide range of competing values. Further, 
the regional approach would allow for the definition of"real, discernible 
needs based upon our intuitive concepts of justice (clean, safe, fairly 
abundant water priced affordably so as to cover the cost of supply and 
transit)" (Feldman 1991, p.50). The true broad range of public interests is 
accommodated by the pooling of available resources within regions for the 
mutual, equitable benefit of all users. Feldman believes that this is not 
possible under the existing state systems because these were developed out 
of the capitalist ethic. 
Feldman's regional administrations would contain operations 
subsystems similar to publicly-owned utilities. These administrations would 
be guided by rules set forth in a social contract. The social contract, either 
tacitly accepted or in constitutional form, sets forth the rules for decision-
making within the regional system (Feldman 1991, p. 73). Feldman derives 
these rules from his environmental ethic. First, residents are entitled to 
certain specific rights and obligated by certain duties. Such rights include 
fair distribution and equal treatment, and duties include full payment of 
costs incurred by water users and beneficiaries. Water subsidies supported 
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by non-beneficiaries and non-users would cease. Also, rules for determining 
and maintaining the regional boundaries would be included. These would 
accommodate both hydrological and cultural patterns, such as watershed 
characteristics and settlement patterns. While actual decisions would be 
flexible over time, the rules for decision-making would be fairly static. 
Perhaps most importantly, the rules" ... would [serve to] establish the 
priorities for allocation, the management of water resources, and the 
criteria for construction projects and for modifications to river basins and 
ground water resources" (Feldman 1991, p. 78). These rules would require 
that any viable plan or decision meet the criteria of structural efficiency. 
Feldman's model emphasizes specifying rules and principles, rather 
than empirically measurable end-states. His approach is qualitative, not 
quantitative. Thus, the regional system would be both flexible and coherent. 
For example, instead oflocking water rights to specific uses and locations, a 
standard set of water allocation rules would provide for changing needs and 
circumstances. Water distributions would not exclude some users during 
shortages, nor would certain new uses be excluded because historic over-
allocations are legally binding. 
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ROGERS' WATER POLICY MODEL 
Assumptions 
Rogers' view of the fundamental problem in water resources policy is 
very different from Feldman's. Rogers locates the primary problem of water 
policy with the public's perception of water resources issues and the 
unrealistic expectations created by those perceptions (Figure 2). His goal in 
developing his model is to illustrate "a ... policy stance that will allow the 
myriad current and proposed ... activities to work together coherently 
without sudden major shifts" (Rogers 1993, p. 7). Further, he believes that 
education, of adults as well as children, is the only way to fully overcome 
the problems that currently arise in water resources policy. Unlike 
Feldman, he believes the crucial response to problems in policy is 
institutional reform at all levels of government, combined with improved 
definition of agency roles and responsibilities. 
Unrealistic expectations for water supplies arise from increasing 
aftluence in society. Rogers claims that: 
Aftluence leads first to a rise in the quantities of water used by 
each individual and his or her support systems, and second to a 
change in attitude toward the environment, from a strictly 
utilitarian concern for short-term human survival to an 
appreciation of the need for long-term sustainability of the 
aquatic ecosystem (Rogers 1993, p. 2). 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Public perception Is the root cause water policy problems. 
ECONOMICS 
- Unrealistic quality and quantity expectations 
LAW 
- Beneficiaries do not pay complete costs 
- Inaccurate water pricing causes water shortages 
Federal legislation Is required preventing: 
- Ground water contamination 
- Non-point source pollution 
POLITICS 
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- Public and environmental health compete (and should not)I 
- Infrastructure definition (and accounting) do not Include 
maintenance and operations 
- lnteragency relations are conflicting, paralyzing policy 
processes 
OBJECTIVES 
- Balance the water budget: fiscal and supply-and-demand 
- Define governmental roles, consolidate and centralize water 
administration 
- Define and enforce water quality standards 
- Educate the public 
METHODS 
- Centralize water administration 
- Create meaningful regions such as problem-sheds 
- Estasblish a federal water council 
- Account for complete costs of water 
- Privatize water; manage water as a commodity 
Figure 2. Rogers' water policy model. 
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Further, costs increase per unit as the demands and expectations increase; 
likewise, the amount of benefit derived from ever-increasing spending at 
some point begins to decrease. Rogers does not think it is reasonable to 
spend money eliminating every minor contaminant from water, whether or 
not harmful, when it might be more productively spent improving other 
areas of public health. 
Like Feldman, Rogers develops an argument for his model of water 
policy in terms of current economic, legal, and political concerns. Far less 
critical of the current state of affairs in water policy than is Feldman, 
Rogers states that he believes the existing system to be generally successful, 
though needful of reforms. 
Economics. Rogers points to high and steadily increasing water costs 
as an indication of unrealistic public expectations for water supplies and 
water quality. Total spending for water resources development through U. 
S. history, he estimates, has been about $400 billion. To maintain water 
supplies and quality at current standards, spending from 1985 through the 
end of the millennium would require an additional $200 billion. Total 
spending on water resources and related programs in 1992, including 
federal, state, local, and private expenditures, was approximately $84 
billion, of which about one-third was federal funds. Much of this money is 
expended assuring that water is a renewable resource. This raises two 
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questions crucial to Rogers: 'how much is enough?,' and 'how clean is clean 
enough?' 
Another problematic economic issue under the existing system is the 
method by which costs are shared. Rogers believes cost sharing 
requirements are a good start. However, costs continue to accrue 
disproportionately to federal and state authorities, rather than directly to 
local beneficiaries. This allows for involvement of higher authorities in the 
direction oflocal water projects, but nonetheless is not entirely equitable. 
Inequities between who pays for and who gains from water resources can 
lead to highly undesirable consequences, according to Rogers. 
One consequence of such inequities, when combined with inaccurate 
water pricing, is water shortages. Rogers believes water shortages are 
primarily an economic, rather than a physical, phenomenon: 
Improper pricing of water, rather than inadequacy of supply, is 
most often the chief culprit in water shortages. Charging users 
what water really costs to produce, manage, treat, deliver, and 
dispose of after use is so sensible a concept that it hardly 
merits elaboration. But the fact is that few water delivery 
systems follow such a policy today (Rogers 1993, p. 185). 
This perspective illustrates Rogers' belief that water policy and 
administration comprise an industry, whether managed as one or not. AB an 
industry based on a particular commodity, it is subject primarily to market 
forces and only secondarily to natural forces. Rogers acknowledges that 
market and natural forces are interwoven, but he does not account for 
natural factors, such as floods or droughts, in his model. 
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Law. Rogers focuses on the regulatory role of federal laws in 
mitigation of environmental problems, rather than on the state riparian and 
prior appropriation systems oflegal property rights in water, as did 
Feldman. Rogers accepts a property rights system of water law, and 
advocates privatization of some currently public functions and a regulated 
free-market approach to water policy. Nonetheless, he believes treatment of 
water with a strictly property rights-free market system is not adequate. He 
points to the success of federal regulation in reducing point-source pollution 
over the last two decades as an example of the potential for effectiveness of 
using environmental regulations to constrain market forces. 
Rogers believes that two water regulation challenges currently face 
Congress. First, ground water protection has not been legislated. Though 
considered urgent for some time, ground water use and contamination 
remain largely unregulated. Ground water supplies are increasingly relied 
upon, yet no national objectives exist to lead states towards implementation 
of ground water plans and regulations. Second, the federal government does 
not provide adequate leadership to state and local governments by directing 
efforts to control non-point source pollution. Lacking federal legislation, 
limited action will occur at a local level to improve situations regarding 
ground water and non-point source pollution, Roger alleges, because 
subjectivity and local interests cannot be effectively transcended by local 
jurisdictions. 
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Politics. Politics is the realm, according to Rogers, wherein society 
sets and attempts to implement goals. Rogers indicates several problematic 
and neglected areas in the political realm. The primary weakness in each of 
the areas is in the poor definition of standards, priorities, and government 
roles. The areas Rogers discusses are: public versus environmental health, 
infrastructure, education and research, and intergovernmental relations. 
The public's expectations for environmental quality fall into the 
political realm, as do questions of public health; both connect to water 
quality and quantity issues. As expectations for improvements in 
environmental quality and public health increase, so expectations for water 
quality and renewability also increase. However, Rogers indicates that 
priorities in environmental quality and public health, though often related, 
are sometimes in opposition; he notes that various programs sometimes 
compete for funds. Public awareness of both connections and competition 
between environmental quality and public health must be raised to begin 
addressing questions of 'how much is enough,' and 'how clean is clean 
enough.' Clear definition of and improved consensus about these questions 
will go far towards setting widely acceptable priorities for water. 
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Water infrastructure, including delivery and waste water treatment 
systems, navigation and irrigation structures, hydropower, and flood 
control, is not adequately maintained, claims Rogers. Urban delivery and 
sewage systems are frequently leaky and of insufficient capacity for storm-
water run-off. Rural delivery systems and irrigation practices are often 
wasteful; new technology might provide significant improvements. 
Irrigation runoff is by-and-large not regulated and monitored. Dams, 
reservoirs, and related large water-project structures are costly to build and 
maintain. Deciding to keep infrastructure in good repair, determining who 
pays the costs, and overseeing maintenance projects is the responsibility of 
political agencies. However, governments frequently do not prioritize this 
maintenance, nor do they consistently appropriate adequate funds to 
support sound infrastructure in good repair. 
Rogers claims this stems from a lack of the political will and 
consistency to set and hold to consistent long-term goals. All too often, the 
background clamor of relatively short-term demands and crises supersedes 
long-term policy decisions. Rogers believes it is critical to maintain long-
term policy objectives, and to minimize capitulation to short-terms demands 
inconsistent with these objectives. 
Government agencies at all levels establish information systems and 
perform research activities, yet lapse in coordinating those efforts, asserts 
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Rogers. Nor is information readily accessible and widely available. In the 
water policy arena particularly, centralization and coordination are 
important to ensure public access to and awareness of current research and 
findings, as well as to minimize agency overlap and redundancy, and to 
improve inter-agency communications. 
Of particular concern to Rogers are jurisdictional conflicts and inter-
agency relations. Rogers refers to differences between physical regions on 
one hand and political regions on the other hand. An example is that the 
geographic variation of hydrology and climate factors across the nation does 
not correspond directly to the geographic variation in jurisdictions with 
authority over water resources, the states. This is fundamentally a question 
about the best scale at which to manage water resources, and Rogers 
proposes federal-level policy-setting combined with local implementation 
and enforcement. This differs from the existing system because states were 
not established based on locally meaningful cultural and natural factors, 
claims Rogers. 
Further, the existing system lacks a single central authority over 
water policy that might settle conflicts of interest through establishing 
national priorities and procedures. A lack of physically and culturally 
"meaningful regionalism" (Rogers 1993, p.14) contributes to problematic 
intergovernmental relations, believes Rogers. Tension between different 
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levels of government (federal, state, and local) arises from differences in 
scale as well as from different interests and preferences. Friction also occurs 
among agencies and organizations at the same general level. 
The increasing number of well-organized interests involved in water 
policy and management also contributes to difficult interagency relations. 
Though such an increase in interests may be legitimate, Rogers believes it 
can paralyze the political process. Effective negotiations and compromises 
are wrought more slowly, if at all, with increased participants, particularly 
when those participants disagree. Problems in inter-agency relations due to 
the plurality of organized interests are exacerbated by a lack of incentives 
for coordinated behavior and consensus. Instead, competition and self-
interest of agencies and organizations are often heightened through a policy 
process involving too many players and too little coordination. 
Objectives and Methods 
Objectives and methods of Rogers' model emphasize institutional 
reforms. The objectives include: 1) complete payment of water costs by 
beneficiaries, 2) definition and centralization of administrative roles, 3) 
definition and enforcement water quality standards, and 4) improvement of 
public education about water issues. The first objective Rogers describes 
rests on the premise that costs of water must be completely paid for by 
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users. Rogers vehemently opposes the concept of treating water as a public 
good that should be free. Balancing expenditures for water with revenues 
from water is also crucial to Rogers' proposal. Rogers mentions the issue of 
equitable distribution of water resources, although he does not explain how 
such equitability would be achieved. Social equity is not addressed as a 
policy objective or standard. Lacking such an equity objective or standard, 
Rogers is susceptible to the criticism that his pay-for-use objective is 
regressive. Feldman's structural efficiency requirement in his payment-for-
use objective allows him to dodge this criticism. 
Rogers alleges that if federally or state held water "creates a benefit, 
[then] the ... government has a claim" (Rogers 1993, p. 189) and that the 
"costs [of water] should be recovered in the price paid by beneficiaries" 
(Rogers 1993, p. 193). Rogers recommends eliminating the gap between 
federally subsidized rates paid by local beneficiaries and actual market 
rates. All users, regardless, should pay equal, full market prices for the 
same resources. Costs might vary based on origin of the supply and 
transportation costs, for instance, but not on user characteristics 
(municipal, agricultural, e.g.). Accurately pricing water obviates the need 
for subsidies. Relevant external costs internalized will yield accurate water 
pricing, and thus the incentive to conserve. Rogers also recommends 
charging for direct use of resources and facilities and for equipment used to 
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enjoy those resources and facilities. For example, a surcharge would accrue 
on prices of boats and fishing equipment, and user fees would apply on 
federal and state waters. 
Further, under Rogers' framework, the term 'infrastructure' would 
expand. Institutional, operational, and maintenance attributes would be 
included with elements of the physical water infrastructure, such as sewers, 
mains, dams, and channels. The organizational attributes would be subject 
to direct charges or taxes, as would the physical attributes. For example, a 
direct tax on water use of 5 cents on 1,000 gallons of drinking water and the 
same tax on waste water would raise more than 1.5 billion dollars each 
year. The revenues raised from charging for the true costs of water would be 
kept in a depository, a "National Water Trust Fund" (Rogers 1993, p. 189). 
This institution might also be responsible for guaranteeing the preservation 
of other capital assets, such as the water infrastructure. Rogers suggests a 
federal water council manage this fund. 
Rogers advocates water markets that are governed by national 
standards for ensuring equitable transfers and least-cost sources of supplies 
to users. Whereas the existing system limits water allocations to specified 
uses and locations, a water market would allow for flexible water 
allocations. Water rights could be transferred according to regulated 
transactions. Federal regulations would guarantee that transactions result 
in a net balance or increase in social benefits, Rogers claims. This would 
allow water to be managed as the commodity Rogers believes it is. 
However, Rogers cautions: 
... the market approach is far from well accepted in the United 
States today. It can run afoul of the concept that water should 
be freely available to all, and the in-stream water for fish and 
wildlife in particular, should be provided at no cost. The 
practice of making a profit from water sales, or even building a 
sinking fund from revenue surpluses in anticipation of future 
needs, is foreign to many purveyors, offensive to many of their 
constituencies, and frequently illegal. And proper pricing can 
encounter a firestorm of political protest, since the ultimate 
step is apt to be at least a doubling of prevailing rates (Rogers 
1993, p. 186). 
The next objective Rogers discusses is the need to clearly define, 
centralize, and coordinate government roles and responsibilities. 
Government agencies and organizations would be consolidated and 
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coordinated by a central, federal-level water agency. Such an agency would 
perhaps fall under the direction of the president, and be organized as a 
council of appointees. The organization would be structured so council 
members would be free of other agency responsibilities and independent of 
competing agencies' missions. This council would formulate national water 
policy, coordinate water resources planning and management, and manage 
the federal water research and information programs. Such a national 
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council would be established by legislation and would direct regional water 
authorities. 
Regions must be meaningful to be effective, however. Because social 
development takes place in a political, economic, and cultural context, 
rather than, for instance, along watersheds and according solely to 
hydrology, watershed management is not the framework Rogers favors. 
Instead, regions comprising a complex set of physical and cultural 
characteristics are in order. Establishing meaningful regionalism in water 
administration is challenging because of the spatial differences between 
administrative jurisdictions and natural watersheds. This difference should 
be resolved for efficient and effective management, according to Rogers. 
Meaningful regions must be determined by local concerns, in accordance 
with state water law and federal regulation. For example, problem-sheds, 
regions aggregated based on specific water resources problems, would be 
more meaningful regions than watersheds, according to Rogers. In such 
problem-sheds, Rogers proposes a regional system of water policy and 
planning that considers cultural factors and natural factors that are of 
value and concern to humans. Defined at the local level, problem-sheds 
would be aggregated regionally, and would fall under the authority of the 
proposed federal water council. The relationship of problem-sheds to 
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existing local, state, and federal jurisdictions is not defined in Rogers' 
discussion. 
Rogers refers obliquely to consolidating existing government agencies 
and organizations. The proliferation of water-related agencies and 
committees in the executive and congressional branches of government is a 
serious concern of Rogers'. However, the closest he comes to making a 
specific recommendation is to say that: 
... the obvious solution in each instance is a measure of 
consolidation: reform of the committee structure in Congress, 
and reorganization of the executive branch agencies .... the 
next best approach would be efforts at improved coordination 
among joint authorizing committees of the House and Senate 
(Rogers 1993, p. 17). 
Centralization of the institutions conducting research and 
maintaining data is also a part of this objective. Decision-making at all 
levels of government requires accessible, current, coordinated, and adequate 
information on water and policy topics. This would be achieved by 
establishing and funding a centralized water research and information 
program, directed by the federal water council. This program would 
coordinate existing research programs as well. Additionally, some public 
education programs, in the form of public forums held regionally, would be 
one means of disseminating information from the researchers to the public. 
43 
Protection of water quality through legislation is the third objective of 
Rogers' model. Specific issues he believes require immediate attention are: 
assessment and protection of ground water, wetlands, in-stream flows, and 
water quality. Rogers believes wetlands' issues in particular have good 
potential for unifying administrative efforts. This goal is to be achieved by 
clarifying reasonable standards, enacting federal regulations, and 
implementing these locally. Water quality regulations must be evaluated in 
conjunction with assessments of true costs and benefits. 
The final and fourth objective of Rogers' model addresses the problem 
of public perceptions and unrealistic expectations. Rogers believes a 
national public education program, coordinated by the federal water council, 
would begin to resolve the fundamental problem of public expectations 
exceeding practical reality. Such an education program must contain not 
only curriculum modifications directed towards school children, but also 
programs directed towards adults. Professionals and individuals involved in 
water resources administration and management in particular must be 
provided with sound and complete information in order to make good 
decisions. 
Rogers' program consists of "a series of regional forums ... held 
around the nation to link the federal water administrators with their state, 
local, and private counterparts" (Rogers 1993, p. 209). These forums would 
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be open to the public, and sponsorship would be encouraged from non-
governmental organizations, including civic, research, and professional 
organizations. It would provide an avenue for public education and also 
would expose federal policy-makers to regional concerns and issues. Several 
specific and important issues would comprise forum topics, including: water 
law, water quality, land use, drought, financing, ground water protection, 
non-point source pollution, wetlands, and in-stream flows. 
Many of the concerns Rogers raises, objectives he poses, and methods 
he recommends are similar to those of Feldman. For example, both are 
concerned with balancing the expenditures and revenues of water and with 
ending water subsidies. Both seek to minimize interagency conflicts and the 
paralysis that results from existing bureaucratic systems. Also, both 
envision a new regional system as the best method of improving water 
administration and management. 
However, Rogers' and Feldman's models diverge in several significant 
ways. Feldman believes that the consideration of water as a commodity is 
highly problematic and instead water must be assessed by non-economic as 
well as economic values. Rogers believes that increasing the involvement of 
the market in water resources administration and management will solve 
economic problems. Feldman thinks that increasing pluralism and authority 
locally will break up the institutionalized conflicts of interest, thereby 
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resolving the problem. Rogers thinks that interagency and inter-
organizational conflicts can be resolved by centralization and coordination 
federally. Feldman models a regional system of water administration based 
on primarily natural factors, with some consideration of cultural factors. 
Rogers models a regional system of water administration based on cultural 
factors and factors of nature as they are assigned value culturally. Finally, 
Feldman's model relies primarily on ethics and Rogers' model ultimately 
relies largely on economics. 
CHAPrERIII 
MALHEUR LAKE BASIN WATER POLICY 
Rendering the water resources and water policy of Malheur Lake 
Basin ("Basin") in terms of simplified physical and human factors will 
enable the comparison with Feldman's and Rogers' models. These factors 
include a consideration of the assumptions, objectives, and methods for 
water policy development and implementation, but do not exclude 
additional descriptive information necessary to an understanding of Basin 
water policy. The physical factors are of central importance to Basin water 
resources and policy concerns. In many ways, Basin hydrology and climate 
determine the character of Basin water policy. Human activities, of course, 
are also a central determinant of Basin water policy. 
PHYSICAL FACTORS OF WATER POLICY 
Malheur Lake Basin is the largest hydrologically-closed basin in the 
State of Oregon, and contains wide, high plains, gently-sloped valleys, 
steeply-walled canyons and high mountains. The peak elevation is 9,670 
feet at Steens Mountain, and the lowest elevation is 4,025 feet in Alvord 
Desert (Figure 3). The Basin combines features of both deserts and 
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wetlands. It contains one of the largest inland wetlands in the nation, and 
one of the most important nesting grounds for the greater sandhill crane 
(Rinella and Schuler 1992). Two national wildlife refuges, several 
wilderness study areas, and a Wild and Scenic River are only a few of the 
important reserves and recreation areas in the Basin. Yet, the primary 
economic activity in the Basin is cattle ranching. 
The two land uses, ranching and wildlife habitat, often compete for 
water resources in the Basin. This results from both physical and cultural 
factors. Conflicts between the two uses are central to water policy 
development by policy makers, as are physical constraints on water 
resources. Physical factors playing a role in policy development include 
climate and hydrology. Cultural factors focus on the two primary values of 
ranching and wildlife. 
Climate 
Malheur Lake Basin climate is arid to semi-arid. Two seasons 
dominate the weather in the Basin. Winters are long and relatively wet, and 
summers are short and very dry. Average annual precipitation for the water 
yearsl from 1944 to 1990 was 9.87 inches. Both winters and summers tend 
1Water years date from October through September; data based on 
measurements taken at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge 
Headquarters climate station. 
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to have extremely variable temperatures. Freezing can occur during any 
time of year. As a closed basin, water exits the Basin almost exclusively 
through evaporation. 
Monthly averages of precipitation for water years 1944 through 1990 
indicate that, despite a secondary peak in May and June, most precipitation 
in the Basin occurs between November and January (Figure 4). Mapping 
mean annual precipitation isohyets (Figure 5) indicates the effects of 
topography on the distribution of precipitation across the Basin, with lower 
elevations averaging less than half the precipitation of high elevations.2 
Average monthly temperature minimums and maximums 
demonstrate the ranges of temperature variability (Figure 6),which are not 
unusual in arid environments, but, combined with a short growing season, 
make many agricultural activities difficult. The seasonal variation of 
temperature and precipitation is hydrologically important. Since 
precipitation in the Basin occurs largely between November and January, 
about 40 percent falls as snow across the entire Basin, and 65 percent as 
snow at high elevations (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970). The 
secondary precipitation peak, between May and June, coincides with 
2Precipitation and temperature data measured at the Malheur 
National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters climate station (climate division 07; 
43 17" N, 118 50' W; elevation 4,109 feet) are available from 1943. Figures 
and statistics in this paper are based on these data, from 1943 through 
1989, unless cited otherwise. 
1.4 ......--------------------------, 
1.2 
~ 
:s 0.8 
§ 
lo.6 
£ 
0.4 
0.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '~ - - - - - - -
0""-~~~-.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Averages by water years 1944-1989 
FiiUre 4. Average monthly precipitation. Based on data from 
Malheur Climate Station. 
50 
- ] 
\/ 
( 
@ ~o 
l ~L~ 
) 
\ 
r-J 
2 
~5. leohyets of Malheur Lake Basin, Oregon. Average 
annu precipitation in inches, based on BLM data. 
51 
s 
100-.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
_.... Average Minimums ...... Average Maximums 
80 l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
C' 
~ 
~ 60 
~ 
I 40 
~ 
~ 
20 
0-'--.-~.----.~-..-~--.-~"""T'"'""~...-~....---.~--..~--.-~--.-~ 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Averages by Water Years, 1944-1989 
Fiirnre 6. Average monthly temperatures. Based on data from 
Malheur Climate Station. 
52 
snow-melt. Therefore, most surface run-off and virtually all ground water 
recharge occurs during the spring thaw (Fuste and McKenzie 1987). 
53 
Storage of Basin waters in lakes leads to high levels of evaporation 
(Rinella and Schuler 1992). Mean annual lake evaporation is estimated to 
be between 39 and 42 inches (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970). 
Additional significant evaporation occurs from soils in areas where the 
water table is within 10 feet of the surface, with .5 inches evaporation per 
day possible where the water table lies within two feet of the ground surface 
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970). 
Other factors affecting evaporation include humidity and irrigation. 
For example, at Malheur Climate Station average relative humidity in July 
commonly varies from 50 percent in the early mornings to less than 20 
percent in the afternoon. In winter, relative humidity averages 80 to 90 
percent at Malheur Climate Station. Evaporation in the summer is 
considerably higher in summer than it is in winter (Columbia-North Pacific 
Technical Staff 1970). Flood irrigation of arable land diverts over 100,000 " 
acre-feet each year from Basin rivers to fields (Rinella and Schuler 1992; 
State Water Resources Board 1967). This flooding coincides with the hottest 
summer months, exacerbating losses to evaporation (Rinella and Schuler 
1992). 
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Hydrology 
Basin hydrology factors important to water policy consist of surface and 
ground water distribution, yields, and water quality. Topography plays a 
large role in both surface and ground water flow systems, which in turn 
dictate water distribution and yields. Ground water recharges in upland 
areas and discharges in the lowlands, along the hydraulic gradient, with a 
regional flow system generally following topography (Gonthier 1985; 
Leonard 1970). With only limited and small scale control structures in the 
Basin, surface water in the Basin also flows from high elevations to low 
elevations. 
Topography also affects seasonal variations in run-off. For instance, 
average monthly stream-flow values for the Silvies and Blitzen rivers 
confirm that the highest run-off occurs between March and June, following 
the spring snow-melt (Figure 7). Responsiveness of the Blitzen River to run-
off lags behind the Silvies River because the Blitzen River drains a smaller 
area at higher elevations than does the Silvies River. The responsiveness of 
ground water to changes in climate, both seasonally and long-term, remains 
to be studied. 
Surface Water Distribution. Although perennial streams discharge 
most run-off in the Basin, the majority of the area of the Basin is drained by 
intermittent streams into playa lakes. Some intermittent and all perennial 
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streams drain into perennial lakes, such as Malheur and Alvord lakes. 
Measurements regarding the quantity and quality of discharge from 
intermittent and minor streams are not available. Research and water 
policy in the Basin emphasizes two perennial streams (Silvies and Blitzen 
rivers) and the Harney Valley lakes (Malheur, Mud, and Harney). 
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The Silvies River begins in the Strawberry Mountains and loses 
about 5,000 feet in elevation on its run to Harney Valley. Because of the 
volume of discharge, elevation change, and geomorphology, the Silvies River 
is the likeliest candidate for structural development in the Basin. The 
Sil vies River has the highest yields of the Basin's streams, with an average 
annual run-off ranging from about 30,000 acre-feet to 220,000 acre-feet over 
the last 50 years. Sil vies River contributes about 25 percent of the total flow 
into Malheur Lake, which, despite its greater total run-off, is far less than 
the contribution of the Blitzen River. This is because the majority of water 
is diverted from Silvies River, for agriculture, before reaching the lake 
(Hubbard 1975; Fuste and McKenzie 1987). 
The Blitzen River originates high on Steens Mountain, draining 
glacially-carved valleys of the south-central Basin to Malheur Lake. 
Tributaries include those on the north and west faces of Steens Mountain, 
from Little Blitzen River to Fish, Krumbo, McCoy, Kiger, and Riddle creeks. 
One-fourth of the area draining Steens Mountain contributes fifty percent of 
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the total discharge of the Blitzen River. This flow peaks primarily in May 
and June, and continues as snow-pack in high elevation canyons melts 
during early summer. These relatively late flows usually provide a good 
irrigation supply throughout the summer, without requiring artificial 
storage. The Blitzen River has more subdued run-off peaks than the Silvies 
River (Figure 7). With average annual run-off ranging from about 20,000 
acre-feet to about 100,000 acre-feet over the last 50 years, total annual 
discharge is less than the Silvies River. However, the Blitzen River 
contributes about 65 percent of the total inflow to Malheur Lake (Hubbard 
1975). 
Water levels of Malheur Lake fluctuate both with the variations in 
run-off received and with variations in direct contributions from 
precipitation. The one percent contribution from ground water, including 
from Sodhouse spring, is not as variable (Hubbard 1975). Run-off into the 
lakes averages about 190,000 acre-feet, after consumptive uses. If the lake 
level exceeds 4,093.5 feet above mean sea level, it overflows into Mud Lake, 
and ultimately Harney Lake, through the Narrows. Average surface area of 
all three lakes is approximately 260 square miles. In very dry years, such as 
1889, 1924, and 1934, both lake beds, and Mud Lake, are dry. The 
extremely wet years of the early 1980s increased Malheur Lake levels to a 
record of 4,102 feet above sea level in 1985 (Fuste and McKenzie 1987). 
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Data on the chemical, biological, and sediment composition of 
streams are limited and available for only scattered sites and times. Based 
on data available, the water quality of the streams seems to be generally 
excellent (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; Rinella and 
Schuller 1992). Phillips and Van Denburgh (1971) questioned the effects of 
agricultural uses of gypsum (calcium sulfate), for soil conditioning, on 
surface water quality. Hubbard (1975) found bottom-sediment samples 
showing minor quantities of pesticides and trace elements. Concern for 
effects of concentrations, in particular, of arsenic and boron on wildlife led 
to a USFWS study in 1985-1986 that showed minimal concentrations of 
these elements in lake area biota (Rinnella and Schuler 1992). Rinella and 
Schuler (1992) found that, during 1988-1989, arsenic and boron exceeded 
Environmental Protection Agency criteria for health protection or for 
beneficial uses in some lake water and biota samples. However, because 
these concentrations were not found in all samples it was determined they 
were not probably causing significant harm. 
Of the lakes in the Basin, Malheur has the best water quality 
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; Rinnella and Schuler 1992). 
The lakes generally have much higher total dissolved solids than the 
streams that enter them (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; 
Rinnella and Schuler 1992). Fuste and McKenzie (1987) noted that, in 1984 
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and 1985, concentrations of dissolved solids increased from Malheur to Mud 
to Harney lakes. They further observed that dissolved solids in Harney 
Lake derived from thermal springs near the lake and from evaporation. 
Ground water. The Basin's aquifers are believed to be hydraulically 
inter-connected and highly interactive with surface water systems. 
Drawdown of ground water supplies is a concern, as this might lower water 
levels in ponds, lakes, and marshes (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 
1970; Rinella and Schuler 1992; State Water Resources Board 1967). 
Recharge is estimated to be in close balance with discharges to pumping, 
springs, lakes, irrigated fields (where the water table is shallow), deep-
rooted plants, and evaporation (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 
1970). These factors make development of ground water resources a delicate 
matter. 
Three geologic units in the Basin have primary hydrologic 
significance as aquifers (Figure 8). A sedimentary unit underlies much of 
Malheur Lake Basin, with basin-fill and alluvium deposits along existing 
stream channels, lake beds, and basin floors, to depths of about 250 feet. 
These sediments include deposits of unconsolidated to semi-consolidated silt 
to gravel. Underlying that tier are volcanics with interbedded sedimentary 
deposits, forming the second major unit. These two aquifers outcrop in over 
half the area of the Basin, and may contain up to 80 percent of the total 
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ground water resources in the Basin. Basalt flows, underlying the second 
unit, outcrop in the Basin's eastern uplands and comprise the third main 
unit (Baldwin, et al. 1992; Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; 
Gonthier 1985; Leonard 1970). 
Although water quality varies widely from site to site, ground water 
with under 1,000 milligrams per liter total dissolved solids3 is estimated to 
be between 75 and 80 percent of the total available supply. Basin ground 
water can have total dissolved solids in excess of 5,000 milligrams per liter 
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 19970). Because boron and sodium 
are toxic to crops, levels of these should be, but are not always, monitored 
closely in ground water used for irrigation. This applies particularly to 
areas near lakes, where surface and ground water alike tend to have higher 
concentrations of dissolved minerals (Columbia-North Pacific Technical 
Staff 1970; Fuste and McKenzie 1987). 
Supply Problems: Shortaies and Surpluses. The primary and most 
common Basin water supply problems are floods and droughts. These result 
from variable flows seasonally and over years. Flows during the spring 
season cannot always be used to maximum benefit; inadequate storage 
facilities mean that the water simply flows to Basin lakes. The late season 
3 Levels recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency are: 
500 mg/I for drinking water; 700 mg/I for irrigation; and to 7000 mg/I for 
large livestock animals (Freeze and Cherry 1979, pp. 386-388) 
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shortages inevitably cause all interested parties concern. For Malheur 
National Wildlife Refuge, problems include a need for draining certain 
areas, dividing Malheur Lake into smaller, more attractive habitat units, 
developing junior water rights in Silver Creek Valley, and managing to cope 
with the extremely variable water supplies (Army Corps of Engineers, 1957; 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962; Wallsworth 1995). 
Water shortages are common annually in the Basin, during the 
middle to late summer and early fall. Flooding, to some degree, also occurs 
commonly, during the spring run-off peaks. This variability of supply 
challenges Basin water users and managers. Persistence of dry or wet years 
poses additional problems. Persistent dry periods occurred between 1928 
and 1941, 1959 and 1964, and 1987 and 1988; particularly wet years were 
recorded in 1897, 1952, and between 1981and1985 (Paulson, et al. 1991; 
Fuste and McKenzie 1987; Army Corps of Engineers 1957). Basin residents 
and officials note that the drought which began in 1987 did not actually end 
until 1991(Bentley1995; Wallsworth 1995). 
Floods occur typically between March and May, when snow melts and 
spring rains fall, but while the ground is often still frozen. Floods primarily 
affect the more densely populated area around the cities of Burns and 
Hines. Urban street networks (Figure 9) are particularly vulnerable to 
floods, and sometimes residents are cut off from access to services. Flood 
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control structures upstream of the urban area on the Silvies River have not 
been built, primarily because effects on Malheur National Wildlife Refuge 
are expected to be negative (Wallsworth 1995). Flood waters in the Basin's 
valleys are used for irrigation when possible, with overflows discharged 
ultimately to the lakes. About 50,000 acres are flooded annually; most is 
crop land. Flood irrigation structures have, in some cases, exacerbated 
problems from flooding. Roads and rail, fields, ranches, residences, and 
wildlife habitat are damaged when it floods. 
The most notable flood on record began with high precipitation levels 
in 1982 and peaked in 1985 with unprecedented lake levels. On June 27, 
1984, Malheur Lake surface elevation reached an historic record high of 
4,102.4 feet, where a normal annual maximum is 4,093 feet (Rinella and 
Schuler 1992, p. 12). At this lake level, more than 170,000 acres were 
submerged, and Malheur, Mud, and Harney lakes were joined into one lake 
(Hubbard 1989). Previous lake surface area maximums, between 1903 and 
1984, ranged from 50,000 to 60,000 acres (Rinella and Schuler 1992). An 
average lake surface area of about 46,000 acres is considered normal (State 
Water Resources Board 1967). Lake elevations increased to 4,102.5 feet in 
1985 and to 4,102.6 feet in 1986. The drought of the late 1980s brought on 
the recession of the lake levels by a foot or more each year to 4,096.4 in 
1990. Parts of two highways, 57,000 acres of wildlife habitat, 25 ranches, 
and the railroad were seriously damaged by flooding (Rinella and Schuler 
1992). 
HUMAN FACTORS OF WATER POLICY 
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Malheur Lake Basin water resources are significant for both 
agricultural and wildlife-related uses. The local economy has been primarily 
based on livestock and forest products since European settlement in the late 
1800s. This economic base is currently in danger of serious decline in 
productivity, according to timber and cattle interests. Wildlife and plant 
habitat throughout the region has been vastly altered by human activities 
over the last 150 years (Reinhardt 1992). Recognized endangerment of fish, 
frog, and bird species has led to attempts to better integrate human 
activities with natural processes to ensure long-term environmental health. 
Interests in agriculture and wildlife are represented in the local population 
and also in the federal agencies that own most of the land area in the Basin. 
The situation is complicated by the tension between state and federal 
authorities over land and water resources, by private interests in the 
Basin's environmental quality, and by the international character of the 
Pacific Flyway of migrating birds. 
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Wildlife and Habitat 
Primary wildlife values in the Basin include several large mammals 
and a wide variety of migratory birds and waterfowl. Key large mammals 
include pronghorn, California bighorn sheep, and mule deer. Key bird 
species include the greater sandhill crane, the trumpeter swan, willow 
flycatcher, and the redhead, mallard, cinnamon teal, and gadwall ducks. 
Two national wildlife refuges protect populations and habitats of these and 
other special status species: Hart Mountain Antelope Refuge and Malheur 
National Wildlife Refuge (Figure 10). Both are administered by the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service. Efforts to protect and maintain adequate 
feeding, breeding, and brooding habitat support the wildlife populations on 
these preserves. Protected habitats include both uplands and wetlands. 
Several types of wetlands habitats are important in the Basin. The 
submergent and emergent communities of open water areas are critical to 
bird populations. Sego pondweed, a dominant member of the submergent 
community, supplies about 80 percent of the diet of all bird species during 
migration periods. Periodic drying of ponds or lakes stimulates vegetation 
growth for several subsequent years because this aerates the soil. The alkali 
playa community includes very little vegetation, except around freshwater 
springs, where woody shrubs dominate. However, shoreflies hatch in June, 
providing a food source for shorebirds and waterfowl through the fall. 
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Meadows are important producers of grasses, sedges, and thistle. Meadows 
are the preferred habitat for sandhill cranes, and also certain owls, ducks, 
and hawks. Along streams and irrigation channels, dense, wooded riparian 
communities occasionally arise. Some hawks, owls, and northern shrikes 
prefer these areas (Littlefield 1990). 
European Settlement Patterns and History 
European settlement and agricultural activities, in the 1860s and 
1870s, displaced the Native American residents and led to the degradation 
of the native grasslands. A few early cattle-ranching enterprises reaped 
high profits from the native grasses in the Basin. This livestock boom lasted 
twenty years, and by the end of the century sagebrush and rabbit brush 
were rapidly replacing the native grasses (Reinhardt 1992). 
The fate of the grassland ecosystem was sealed when as many as 
three million sheep grazed the Oregon high desert Basin early in the 
century (Reinhardt 1992). Sheep graze grasses to the roots, ensuring death; 
cattle, on the other hand, graze to within several inches of the roots. In 
addition to virtually eradicating the grasses by feeding, grazing livestock 
intensively degrades stream beds and increases erosion through trampling 
and disturbance of vegetation and soils. Water quality is degraded by 
animals defecating near streams. 
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Nonetheless, the revised homestead act of 1909 offered 320-acre 
parcels for $10 to promote settlement. Promoters portrayed arable, lush 
valleys. The settlers instead met with harsh winters, floods, dry summers, 
unseasonable frosts, and alkali soils. By the mid-1920s, few settlements 
remained, and many homesteads had reverted to the government 
(Reinhardt 1992). Roughly the same settlement patterns of the 1900s 
persists today. Single-family ranches are thinly scattered throughout the 
Basin, and most of the Basin's population of about 6,000 reside in Harney 
Valley. Harney County grew from 2,559 to 4,059 residents between 1890 
and 1910, and to a peak of 8,314 in 1980. However, between 1980 and 1990 
the population in Harney County declined to 7 ,060 (U. S. Department of 
Commerce 1913a; 1922b; 1993a). Agricultural activities, including ranching, 
in the Basin have been fairly static for almost a century. In 1910, there 
were 443 farms in Harney County; in 1992, there were 442 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1913b; 1993b). In 1992, about 22 percent of these farms grossed 
over $100,000; 19 percent grossed under $2,500. The remaining 59 percent 
make sales amounting to between $2,500 and $100,000 annually (U. S. 
Census Bureau, 1993b). 
Conservation efforts were not altogether absent during the period of 
settlement by Europeans. Malheur National Wildlife Refuge was 
established in 1908 by the executive order of President Theodore Roosevelt 
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as a bird sanctuary. In 1935 and 1941over120,000 acres of additional land 
was annexed from two area ranches, bringing the total area under refuge 
authority to over 184,000 acres. Water rights were acquired with the land 
annexations (Rinella and Schuler 1992; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
1992). Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge was established in 1936. 
The total area within the refuge boundaries is 277 ,893 acres. This includes 
11,998 acres of state in-holdings, and 14,600 acres of private and county in-
holdings (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). The Taylor Grazing Act 
(1934) established a permit system for grazing that curtailed unlimited 
grazing by sheep. As the sheep disappeared from the range, certain native 
flora began to reappear (Reinhardt 1992). Under the Wilderness Act of 
1964, millions of acres were recently reserved as potential wilderness areas 
("wilderness study areas"). This prevents logging and development of 
infrastructure (roads, power lines) on these lands, though some grazing and 
mining are allowed to continue (Reinhardt 1992; U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management 1993a). 
Efforts by livestock interests to rehabilitate the depleted rangelands 
have included fencing streams, removing sagebrush and juniper, and 
seeding with wheatgrasses. Modifying vegetation fosters problems including 
encouraging erosion, opening ground to invasion, and limiting habitat 
diversity (Benyus 1989). These endeavors occur on both private and public 
lands, with guidance and assistance from the BLM (U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management 1982; 1992b). 
Governance and Policy Planning 
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In 1967, Oregon determined that no water remained under state 
jurisdiction in the Basin, as supplies were over-appropriated (State Water 
Resources Board 1967). No state plan for the Basin water resources has 
been released since that 1967 report, which advocated structural 
development for flood control and supply storage. The most recent relevant 
federal agency plans were drafted and approved within the last five years. 
Rather than restricting natural variability, these plans seek to manage 
through simulation of the natural patterns of a variable water supply. 
Such mimicry is still a method of control, however. Radical changes 
in land use, such as condemning or retiring the farm or rangeland, are not 
considered; even slight decreases in grazing allotments on National Wildlife 
Refuge land lead to public outcry. The human struggle to carve a living out 
of this Basin's uplands and wetlands continues, mostly through agriculture 
(Figure 11), but occasionally, and increasingly, through tourism. 
State Water Policy. Oregon has a history marked by increasing 
emphasis on regional administration of water resources. In 1864, the state 
legislated that miners could claim water rights (Oregon Water Resources 
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By irrigation class, based on BLM data. 
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Department 1992). In 1868, the legislature provided that landowners might 
apply for county permits for draining wetlands, modifying stream channels, 
and constructing flood control embankments. In 1891, the state defined the 
first beneficial uses as irrigation, livestock, and domestic uses. Mining and 
hydropower were added in 1899 to this list. The control of the state over 
waters within its borders was formalized in the Water Appropriation Act of 
1909, often called the State Water Code. In 1955, the State Water Resources 
Board was created, which merged with the State Engineer's Office to form 
the existing Water Resources Department. In 1985, restructuring placed the 
new Water Resources Commission in charge of the Water Resources 
Department. 
Oregon's water law system is based on rights of prior appropriation 
and also elements of riparian law, as codified in the Water Appropriation 
Act of 1909. Water rights in this system are property rights. A water right is 
dated, for priority, with the date the right was claimed. The right specifies 
how much water, from what source (or diversion point), will be applied 
where, for what purpose. The purposes must be beneficial uses. The right is 
forfeited if it is not used at least once every five years. If water is in short 
supply or over-appropriated, rights with the oldest dates are honored first. 
Any water right can be transferred, if properly sought and authorized 
through the Water Resources Department. 
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Some surface and ground water uses are exempt from usual water 
rights. For example, land owners may use spring water that originates on 
their property and does not form into a channel that flows off their property. 
Stock watering is also exempt, as long as surface water is not diverted for 
this use. Watering of non-commercial lawns and gardens of less than one-
half acre with ground water is exempt. Industrial and commercial use of 
ground water is exempt iffor a single purpose and not in excess of 5,000 
gallons per day (Oregon Water Resources Department 1994). 
In the 1967 Malheur Lake Basin Report, the state proposed a 
comprehensive water resources policy and plan for the Basin. This plan, still 
theoretically in effect, suggests that economic growth and concurrent 
maintenance of wildlife goals are possible in the Basin. In order to strike a 
better balance between these apparently competing goals, the plan proposes 
construction of a dam and reservoir in the Silvies Canyon. The state and the 
Army Corps of Engineers have both recommended developing the Silvies 
River (Army Corps of Engineers 1957; State Water Resources Board 1967). 
As noted previously, such development has not been undertaken. This is 
apparently because of the uncertain effects on habitat for birds visiting and 
residing on the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (Wallsworth 1995). 
The state recently developed a new drought policy. Because of a state-
wide drought in the late 1980s, Oregon's governor appointed an interagency 
?<-
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Drought Council, which began comprehensive planning for future droughts. 
The Drought Council is inventorying resources available to respond to 
drought conditions and developing plans and procedures to mitigate the 
effects of drought. Perhaps most importantly for Malheur Lake Basin, this 
council has drafted procedures for simplifying legal water rights transfers 
under drought conditions. 
Drought becomes official when the governor declares an area to be a 
drought emergency area. The governor is prompted to make such 
declarations on the request of a county. Counties typically make requests 
when the U.S. Natural Resource Conservation Service releases its 
streamflow forecasts based on the snow-pack. By law, during droughts, 
junior water rights holders would forfeit any rights to available water while 
senior right holders receive their full allotment. However, one method used 
in the Basin to manage dry years is temporarily transferring water rights. 
In the past, this required applications for special permits and waivers from 
the Oregon Water Resources Department. Since many counties are 
concurrently affected by drought, this created excessive paperwork for the 
Water Resources Department. The new procedures establish means of easily 
and legally transferring water rights when drought conditions are declared, 
thereby mitigating the impacts of drought (Norris 1994). 
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Federal Water Policy. Federal agencies (the BLM, the USFS, and the 
USFWS) hold most of the land in the Basin (Figure 11). These agencies 
manage the water under their jurisdiction in accordance with their missions 
and land-use objectives, and include water management plans in policies, 
land use plans, and environmental impact statements. These plans each 
typically consider several alternatives, generally in comparison with both a 
preferred alternative and a projection of baseline, existing plans. Local 
participation is encouraged through a public review process. While policies 
are typically set to correspond to national goals and agency missions, policy 
makers adjust plans in the review process to accommodate public objections 
that do not compromise agency missions. The final decision to implement 
plans is made by the particular agency's district officials, with regional 
office approval. 
The USFS has the least visible and least controversial role of the 
three federal agencies in the Basin. In the northern Basin, 779,400 acres 
fall under USFS jurisdiction. Responsible for the lands that provide 
headwaters for the Silvies and Silver rivers systems, the USFS manages the 
Malheur and Ochocco National Forests for multiple uses, including timber 
harvests, grazing, recreation, and wilderness preservation. Plans are 
subject to review evecy 10 years. The current plan for Malheur National 
Forest was implemented in 1990, and the current plan for Ochocco National 
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Forest was implemented in 1989. These plans anticipate few changes in 
land and water use and management over the next ten to twenty years (U. 
S. Forest Service 1991). 
The BLM is responsible for the multiple use development of public 
lands and resources, and also for providing sustained yields and enhanced 
environmental quality (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986; 1992b). 
The BLM Burns District contains two management areas, both of which fall 
primarily within the Basin. The southern boundary of the Three River 
Resource Area lies about 20 miles south of Malheur and Harney lakes, and 
extends north beyond the Basin boundary. The BLM lands south of this 
management area, as far as the Oregon border, are included in the Andrews 
Resource Area. Most BLM lands in the Basin are rangelands. The 
rangelands are managed within a system of grazing allotments for 
consistent levels of grazing over time and for rangeland improvements. 
Programs for rangeland improvements include riparian rehabilitation 
projects and various rangeland vegetation improvement projects (U.S. 
Bureau of Land Management 1986; Bentley 1995). 
The BLM also manages specially designated areas. The Wilderness 
Study Areas ("WSAs"), maintained for the time being as though already 
designated, were first proposed in 1985. In the Basin, 21 of23 proposed 
WSAs, covering a total of 1,075,337 acres, lie in the Andrews Resource Area 
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(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1993a). Two other areas have special 
designations. First, part of the Blitzen River and several tributaries, a total 
of74.8 miles of streams, became a National Wild and Scenic River in 1988. 
Second, the Steens Mountain loop road, built beginning in 1930 and 
completed in 1962, was to close in 1982. Because of opposition and 
continued public use of the loop road area, this closure was never 
implemented. In spite of protests appealing the continued use of the loop 
road, filed by the Oregon Natural Resources Council, funds for improving 
the loop road area were approved in the spring of 1995 (Bentley 1995). 
Although the USFWS has an established national mission, the two 
refuges in the Basin are managed somewhat differently. The national 
mission, in brief, is to preserve, enhance, and restore ecosystems for all 
endangered or threatened species, and to preserve migratory bird 
populations (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1982). However, the two 
refuges have distinctly different physical landscapes and different specific 
goals. Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, located in wetlands, emphasizes 
protection of migratory and endangered bird populations. Hart Mountain 
National Antelope Refuge, sited on a ridge, emphasizes protection of native 
and endangered large mammals. 
The management goals of the USFWS for Malheur National Wildlife 
Refuge ("Refuge") are more single-purpose and visible than those of other 
K 
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agencies in the Basin. The Refuge mission stipulates maintenance of 
habitat diversity, wildlife diversity, public use quality, and wildlife quality. 
The principles set forth to guide management practices include an emphasis 
on holistic, ecosystems approaches, native/indigenous species, and natural 
processes, such as drought-flood cycles, fire cycles, and grazing (U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service 1985). Under drought conditions, the priority for water 
uses is pond maintenance; during floods, the priority is to maximize water 
use, while at the same time preserving emergent plant communities 
(Wallsworth 1995). 
Two areas in the Refuge allow for structural and developed 
management of water with dikes, ditches, water-control structures, 
constructed ponds and nesting islands, farming, grazing, and irrigation. The 
area surrounding and including Harney, Mud, and Malheur lakes is 
managed to closely simulate natural hydrologic processes (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 1985; 1992). In recent years, adjustments to plans have 
been made to still more closely reflect natural processes, even in the 
structurally managed areas (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). Changes 
to existing practices in the Blitzen Valley, for example, include decreasing 
grazing permits by nine percent, and doubling hayfields (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 1990). 
" 
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Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge ("NAR") was established by 
executive order in 1936 and contains a total of 277 ,893 acres. All but the 
steep west slopes of Hart Mountain and Poker Jim Ridge are contained 
within Malheur Lake Basin. The current management plan, developed 
between 1989 and 1994, will be in force through 1999. The goals of the 
Refuge include management for healthy pronghorn populations, restoration 
of native ecosystems, and primitive recreation and education (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 1994). In particular, restoration of riparian habitats and 
eroded stream channels, and overall watershed stability, is of high priority. 
The degradation of riparian habitats is attributed to severe, persistent over-
grazing. Complete habitat restoration is expected to take 200 years. The 
issue of livestock grazing on NAR lands continues to be controversial, as it 
is throughout the Basin. 
Interagency and Intergovernmental Conflicts 
The most obvious source of friction lies between those who represent 
the interests in water and land use for agriculture on one hand and for 
wildlife habitat on the other. Both rely on water and conflicts over water 
arise particularly during shortages. The most apparent tension exists 
between the BLM and the USFWS. Though representatives of both agencies 
acknowledge some tension, and the need for improved relations, rarely are 
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members of one agency included in development of plans and policies. For 
instance, though one of the BLM's goals is to increase consultations with the 
USFWS (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986), the USFWS was not 
consulted in the preparation of the National Wild and Scenic River Donner 
and Blitzen Management Plan (1992). Other agencies were consulted 
including the USFS. This is in spite of the fact that the USFS lands lie over 
forty miles to the north, while the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge 
includes lands downstream of the designated Wild and Scenic River area. 
Further, the BLM is subject to the conditions of the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 and has both Wildlife Management and Endangered Species 
Management programs. Explicit mention is made of coordinating these 
programs closely with the Oregon State Department of Fish and Wildlife; no 
mention is made of the USFWS (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986). 
Although the intent of the BLM programs parallels the intent of the 
USFWS mission, it is as though the programs are competitive rather than 
complementary. 
Conflicts have also come up between Oregon and the USFWS over 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. Following the establishment of the 
Refuge, the state argued that "it had legal jurisdiction over those lands 
within the meander line of all navigable bodies of water within the State, 
including Malheur, Harney, and Mud lakes" (USFWS 1985, p. 18). The 
State was found not to have such a title to those lands in the mid-1930s, 
upholding the federal designation of the Refuge lands. 
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During the 1950s, Oregon challenged the use of Refuge water rights 
for wildlife habitat preservation. The water rights in question were acquired 
with the ranch property annexations to the Refuge. Water rights in Oregon 
are permitted for uses specified at the time of the claim. The State alleged 
that the USFWS was not using the water for the uses stipulated in the 
right. However, the USFWS was determined in court to be using the water 
appropriately and the water right was upheld, rather than reverted to the 
state (U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962; Wallsworth 1995). Notably, 
both conflicts between Oregon and the USFWS and between the BLM and 
USFWS occur where one jurisdiction is geographically virtually surrounded 
the other. Conflicts with private organizations and interests tends, on the 
other hand, to occur when plans and policies are revised. 
The opposition of environmentalists to the preliminary testing for 
geothermal energy development at Borax Lake by Anadarko Petrochemical 
is an example of private parties' resistance to changes in water policy. 
Groups including the Oregon Natural Resources Council and Nature 
Conservancy were involved in protesting the plant on the grounds that it 
may endanger the rare Borax Lake Chub, a carp (Cockle 1994). 
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Another example is the resistance of ranchers to changes in grazing 
allotments and waterhole access in recent years. For instance, one rancher's 
grazing permit for a Malheur National Wildlife Refuge allotment and 
waterhole access was rescinded by the USFWS two years ago. The rancher 
grazed and watered livestock on Refuge lands without the permit and was 
arrested in August of 1994. The USFWS had decreased grazing permits on 
Refuge lands over the previous several years, heedless of the objections of 
the ranching community. BLM rangeland policies had also changed in 
recent years. The arrest served as a catalyst for the dissatisfaction of the 
ranchers with federal policies, and a large demonstration was organized in 
support of the arrested rancher and in protest of changing federal policy 
(Hogan 1994). 
These conflicts have led to trade-offs and compromises in policy. The 
agricultural and economic development interests have won some conflicts. 
The idea of competitive bidding for state grazing permits was never made 
into policy (Barnard 1994). BLM rangeland management and grazing 
policies have been reformed over the last decade to include wildlife, 
wilderness, and rangeland habitat protections. However, national rangeland 
reforms proposed in 1994 that included greatly increased grazing fees, 
among other stipulations, were largely successfully resisted by ranching 
interests (Durbin 1994). The BLM was upheld in its development of the 
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Steens Mountain Loop Road recreation area (U. S. Bureau of Land 
Management 1993b). Anadarko Petroleum will certainly be developing a 
geothermal plant near Borax Lake in the Alvord Desert, though the Nature 
Conservancy bought the 10 acre lake (Cockle 1994). 
The wildlife habitat preservation interests have prevailed in other 
conflicts. There has been no major structural development of Basin rivers, 
though this would be supported by many ranchers (Bentley 1995). There is 
an increasing emphasis on wildlife protection and habitat improvement, 
including rangeland improvement, by all agencies holding land in the Basin 
(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1992b; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
1990). The relatively senior water rights of the Refuge have been upheld, 
which is significant because Refuge lakes collect much of the run-off of the 
Basin Wallsworth 1995). This means that negative impacts to Refuge water 
must be considered by upstream water and land users. The authority of the 
federal government over federal lands, established by the U.S. Constitution 
Property Clause, has been upheld, allowing federal agencies to set locally 
unpopular policy in order to fulfill their missions (Durbin 1994; Anonymous 
1995). Although conflicts over water and related land use policy may 
occasionally be severe, they seem to lead ultimately to policy trade-offs and 
compromises. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
This comparison evaluates each of the models to determine if they 
provide useful frameworks for Malheur Lake Basin water policy. The 
assumptions of both models are shown to be overly-simplistic and 
unrealistic in comparison to Malheur Lake Basin circumstances. Further, 
the objectives and methods each proposes to address their assumptions are 
not useful for Malheur Lake Basin water policy. Because some objectives 
and methods are no different from the existing system, replacing the 
existing system with them in order to improve water policy makes little 
sense. Other objectives and methods are simply not feasible for application 
in the Basin. Finally, both models omit consideration of critical factors for 
Basin water policy. 
In particular, four areas are found to be discontinuous between the 
models and the case (Figure 12). Feldman believes that water is not a 
commodity and the capitalist markets are not the best basis for making 
policy decision. Further, he considers participation in water policy processes 
to be limited to narrow interests. The solution he proposes in 
FELDMAN 
Water is not a commodity 
Capitalism & markets are not good engines for 
water policy decisions 
Participation in water policy is too limited 
Seeks a top-down approach: normative environmental 
ethic and Social contract rules for decision-making to guide 
watershed administrations 
ROGERS 
Water is a commodity 
Capitalist markets are good engines for policy (if regulated) 
Too many participants in water policy processes 
Seeks top-down approach: centralized, federal 
authority regulating water market transactions and 
problem-shed administrations 
MALHEUR LAKE BASIN 
Water supplies are naturally variable 
Two strong, persistent, sometimes conflicting priorities for water 
Number of participants not as important an issue as the 
identity of participants 
Local resistance to federal authority, but reliance on 
access to federal lands 
Fi1n1re 12. Comparison of two water policy models and Malheur 
Lake Basin, Oregon. 
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his model is a top-down approach, with principles of a normative 
environmental ethic and rules of a national social contract providing the 
basis for water policy development. 
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Rogers believes that water is a commodity and that increasing 
privatization and market strategies will lead to improved water policy. 
Rogers considers the number of participants in water policy development to 
be excessive. The model he suggests also offers a top-down strategy, with a 
centralized, federal authority regulating water market transactions. 
The circumstances surrounding water policy in Malheur Lake Basin 
are significantly different than those in the models. Water supplies in the 
Basin are naturally widely variable. Two strong priorities for water use 
have persisted in the Basin since European settlement. These priorities 
relate to the two primary Basin lands uses for agriculture, largely ranching, 
and for wildlife habitat. The agricultural priority is driven largely be 
economic concerns and the wildlife priority is motivated largely by 
environmental concerns. However, there is no evidence that 
environmentalism and capitalism are mutually exclusive priorities in the 
Basin. The level of participation in the Basin by private parties is high and 
both federal and state agents are also represented in Basin policy 
development. Although the number of participants in water and related 
land use policy is sometimes high, the identity and affiliation of participants 
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with one of the two primary interests seems to be more important than the 
number of participants. Finally, there is strong local reliance on public 
lands for both ranching and wildlife, with a concurrent, and increasing, 
resistance to federal authority. 
For instance, numerous individuals and organizations with an 
interest in ranching, and fewer with environmental concerns, attended local 
meetings, one with Secretary of the Interior Babbitt, over recent reforms of 
federal rangeland policies (Durbin 1994). Resistance to raised grazing fees 
by ranchers throughout the West, similar to the resistance evidenced in the 
Burns meetings, effectively blocked a drastic increase in the fees. An 
acceptable policy decision was made with numerous participants. This 
example also illustrates local resistance to federal authority. 
Alternately, the establishment and maintenance of Malheur National 
Wildlife Refuge and water rights has been disputed by the state and also by 
local individuals such as the rancher who was arrested in 1994. Yet, the 
rights and decisions of the Refuge have been upheld effectively, with water 
policy decisions made by a single participant. First President Roosevelt 
established the Refuge by executive order, and subsequently most on-going 
decisions are made by the USFWS solely. These decisions have required 
support of the courts on occasion, for instance when the state challenged the 
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Refuge's rightful use of water allocations in the 1950s. Nonetheless, water 
policy decisions have not led to frequent and obvious local resistance. 
FELDMAN'S MODEL AND MALHEUR LAKE BASIN 
Feldman believes that good water policy decisions are not based on 
the market and that focusing on economic considerations in water policy 
precludes the consideration of non-economic values. He recommends 
replacing capitalism with environmentalism, and increasing pluralism in 
water administration by establishing a new regional system. However, 
Basin circumstances show that market-based decisions have not necessarily 
had bad outcomes for either people or their environment. Further, 
capitalism and environmentalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive in 
the Basin. Finally, establishing a new regional system instead of the 
existing state system of water law is not feasible. 
Economics 
In the Basin, the history of water rights appropriations determines 
water allocations. This system of water rights originally developed to 
accommodate miners' pre-existing method of making water rights claims. It 
served, as intended, to encourage settlement and economic growth in the 
state. However, this is no longer the case. Because water in the Basin is 
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over-appropriated, it is possible that economic growth is functionally 
constrained. While the population and agricultural statistics vary somewhat 
over time, they nonetheless suggest that economic growth in the Basin is 
limited. 
Feldman does not model concrete strategies for assessing non-
economic values in making policy decisions in spite of his focus on such 
values. In the Basin, non-economic values are considered and debated 
widely. Ranchers are involved in rangeland improvements (Bentley 1995; 
Bureau of Land Management 1986; Otley 1994). Ranchers have no interest 
in worsening the already difficult conditions in the Basin. Many ranchers 
deny that grazing degrades land and water resources and believe that well-
managed grazing contributes to the overall environmental health of the 
Basin. 
Non-economic values were a factor in establishing the wildlife refuges 
and other protected areas in the Basin. It is difficult to imagine that 
revenues generated by visitors to the refuges were ever expected to be 
sufficient to be a primary motivation for the designation of large portions of 
public lands as protected areas. Although the actual motivations may have 
been partially political, rather than strictly environmental, nonetheless 
such motives led to serious and continuing consideration of non-economic 
values in the Basin. Non-economic values held by residents and visitors 
alike include a sense of place, scenic views, and proximity to nature, 
wildlife, and wilderness (Otley 1994; Wallsworth 1995; Bentley 1995). 
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Feldman fails to consider certain factors critical to Basin water 
policy. Humans must, according to Feldman, live in harmony with nature 
and accept nature's uncertainty. This does not account for people's practical 
need for forecasting productivity levels, and does not provide for concrete 
measures to prevent or compensate for losses from unexpected events. In 
the Basin, forecasting availability of water each year can be literally a 
matter of survival for some residents. 
Law 
One of Feldman's primary concerns is that water rights do not 
balance water supply with demand. Also, water rights transfers, claims 
Feldman, are not feasible under existing systems of law. Water rights in the 
Basin indeed are not based on physical availability of water. A water right 
allocates a specific amount of water for a certain purpose at a certain time, 
rather than a percentage of available water for the best use given that 
year's supply. However, some forecasting of water supplies is done by the U. 
S. Natural Resource Conservation Service. While this does not have direct 
implications for water rights (i. e., water rights are not affected by the 
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predictions) such forecasting does allow users to modify their plans for that 
year or to apply for water transfer permits. 
Feldman claims that existing water law systems do not allow for 
water rights transfers; this is not the case in the Basin. Water rights 
transfer rules are being revised to allow for simple processing of pre-
determined transfers during times of shortages. These were always 
permissible with an approved application to the State Water Resources 
Department (Norris 1994; Bentley 1995). 
Feldman also alleges that ground water is not treated adequately 
under water law. However, Oregon water law has permitting rules for 
ground water similar to those for surface water. Other than certain exempt 
uses, such as domestic use, permits for use, as well as for digging wells and 
holes, are required. Further, the expense of developing wells in much of the 
Basin, for instance where the water table is at great depth, is a factor that 
limits exploitation of this resource. 
Politics 
Feldman suggests replacing the existing system of state water laws 
with a regional system of water policy administration to facilitate the 
replacement of capitalism with environmentalism. Such a system might 
resolve certain jurisdictional overlaps in the Basin, but the circumstances of 
the Basin do not uphold the idea that it is necessary to replace capitalism 
with environmentalism. Environmental concerns are not necessarily 
excluded from consideration in policy in spite of a capitalist economics 
system. Non-economic, environmental values are considered seriously in 
Basin policy and planning, as are economic values. 
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A main political concern of Feldman's is that all public interests are 
well-represented in the political process. Interests that exist internally to 
the Basin are well represented politically, and external interests also have 
participated in local politics. Basin policy development is directly concerned 
with balancing these interests, such as local ranching interests and national 
and local interests in migratory bird protection. Those interests that are not 
directly involved in governance are represented through private 
participation in political processes, through committees, groups, and as 
concerned citizens and individuals. Citizen committees have been set up to 
advise both the USFWS and the BLM in developing plans and 
environmental assessments. Private, non-profit organizations particularly 
active in local policy development include the Oregon Cattlemen's 
Association, Oregon Natural Desert Association, Oregon Natural Resources 
Coucil, Oregon Trout, Oregon Watershed Improvement Coalition, the 
Nature Conservancy, and the Sierra Club. Although there are often conflicts 
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between interest groups, particularly over water and land use issues, these 
have historically proved to lead to trade-offs and compromises. 
Objectives and Methods 
Feldman's primary objectives are developing harmony between 
society and nature and establishing an environmental ethic that provides 
for equitable distribution of resources. This objective is largely irrelevant as 
a water policy goal for the Basin. Ranchers and wildlife preservationists 
alike enjoy the natural values of the Basin landscape. However, the belief 
that human society will exist in complete harmony with nature is naive and 
unrealistic. Natural variability in water supplies and climate do not 
encourage consistently harmonious relations between humans and their 
environment in the Basin. Instead, as balances between various human 
interests are wrought often as naught through conflicts, so livings are 
earned in the Basin in a fashion also fraught with difficulties and 
challenges. To ensure survival in extremely dry years, or to maximize 
benefits and minimize waste in more moderate or wet years, water in the 
Basin is sometimes redistributed using legal water rights transfers. 
Feldman's methods focus on establishing watershed-based 
administrations guided by a rule-based social contract. This would, 
according to Feldman, replace the capitalist system, narrow interests, and 
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property rights system oflaw and water allocations. However, it is not clear 
that the regional administration Feldman proposes would look any different 
from what already exists in the Basin. Feldman does not provide sufficient 
detail to determine that his suggestion would have a truly different 
outcome. 
Feldman's argument that capitalism and environmentalism cannot 
co-exist is not convincing given Basin circumstances; both so-called "ethics" 
are well-represented in the Basin. In fact, individuals seeking to profit from 
Basin resources also often have high regard for the non-economic values in 
the Basin. For instance, many ranchers believe that rangeland conditions 
can be improved with sound grazing practices. 
In Oregon, the administration of surface water law is already based 
on watersheds. Feldman does not clearly specify how water rights would be 
re-allocated in his system, and therefore it is impossible to determine if 
eliminating current water rights is either necessary or wise. Water rights in 
the Basin date back to the early European settlers. Rescinding these rights 
is not feasible and would threaten the livelihoods of many residents. Also, 
improved equitability is not, as Feldman believes, impossible under the 
existing system. For instance, water rights transfer procedures were 
recently streamlined by the state to provide for more equitable and efficient 
re-allocation during droughts. 
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Although the watershed basins in Oregon are not independent and 
distinct regions, the usefulness of replacing the existing administrative 
system with such a region to increase pluralism is not indicated by Basin 
circumstances. Even assuming that increased pluralism would be beneficial 
and that it is feasible to replace the existing system, it is not clear that 
Feldman's system would actually increase pluralism in the Basin. 
Planning procedures require public notification and meetings, and 
public involvement in developing Basin policy is high. For instance, recent 
plans indicate those private interests involved as individuals, on special 
committees, and through organizations. Agencies take private-sector 
recommendations seriously and often adjust plans accordingly (U.S. Bureau 
of Land Management 1993b; 1992a; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1992; 
1990). It does not seem likely that replacing the existing Basin system of 
overlapping jurisdictions, an involved public, and conflicting interests with 
Feldman's regional administrations would increase pluralism. 
ROGERS' MODEL AND MALHEUR LAKE BASIN 
Rogers believes unrealistic public perceptions and expectations make 
water policy decisions difficult and administration expensive. Accurately 
pricing water and centralizing administration will mitigate the effects of 
unrealistic expectations, claims Rogers. Basin circumstances support 
97 
Rogers' suggestion that perception and expectations can play a major role in 
water policy. Federal subsidization of public lands and water is expected in 
the Basin, whether for the support of livestock grazing or of wildlife 
preservation. Also, there is a perception that it is good policy to attempt to 
control the natural variability of water. Such expectations and perceptions 
may well add to the costs of water administration, and strictly adhering to a 
long-term policy of accounting for complete costs and obtaining payment 
from users is an intriguing suggestion. However, in the Basin, it is possible 
that only the wealthiest residents would be able to afford water, whether for 
agriculture or for wildlife habitat, if a strict policy of payment-for-use were 
implemented. 
Economics 
Costs distribution in the Basin is not entirely in proportion to 
benefits distribution; federal agencies maintain public lands and some 
water on those lands but only local and state residents regularly use these 
resources. Agricultural uses are by far the largest in the Basin. Farmers 
generally pay for and maintain their own delivery, irrigation, and flood 
control structures. However, the water-related costs accrued from grazing 
on public lands in the Basin have not been quantified. Exempt water uses 
can also be considered to be subsidized, by the state. For example, domestic 
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use and stock watering using ground water is not subject to permitting rules 
(Oregon Water Resources Department 1994). Those on city water supplies 
are primarily domestic users. These are negligible users of the total Basin 
water supply, and the water (ground water) is paid for by user fees. 
Tourism does not generate significant revenues for agencies 
administering the public lands where the tourism activities primarily occur 
(BLM 1986; USFWS 1994). Further, most visitors from outside the Basin 
are from within Oregon (Bureau of Land Management 1986). This means 
that federal agency budgets are paying for benefits enjoyed by mostly local 
and state residents. Federal and state subsidies spread the costs of water 
and public lands among both users and non-users. However, it is possible 
that without such subsidies the Basin would support far fewer residents, 
both people and wildlife. 
Rogers does not account at all for an area of crucial concern in the 
Basin: the natural variability of the water supply. For example, he claims 
water shortages result from inaccurate pricing, not droughts. He also 
virtually defines non-economic values out of his model. Rogers believes 
resources can be managed strictly as commodities, subject to primarily 
market forces. Rogers' rejects a consideration of water as a public good. 
However, treating water strictly as a commodity is not practical in the 
Basin. Natural variability of water is often a serious public nuisance and 
99 
causes occasional disasters in the Basin. Droughts and floods, and the 
damage associated with these events, cannot feasibly be managed with 
privatized and market strategies. Entirely private responsibility for water is 
not feasible in the Basin if the character and current values of the Basin are 
to be maintained. 
Law 
In his focus on the regulatory side of law, Rogers' says that ground 
water and non-point source pollution issues require federal legislation and 
leadership. Rogers does not explain how the federal government would have 
legal authority to regulate ground water, which is technically under state 
juridiction. The state of Oregon has been fairly progressive in developing 
ground water regulations, and revised ground water rules in 1994 to strictly 
regulte all drilling of wells and holes (Norris 1994). Also, non-point source 
pollution from irrigation run-off was not found to be a pressing problem in 
the Basin (Rinella and Schuler 1992). Erosion is a concern in the Basin, 
because livestock has depleted deep-rooted vegetation in riparian areas (U. 
S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994); however, this is not included in Rogers' 
model. In any case, it is not certain that the assertion of such federal rules 
would easily lead state and local agents to implement those rules. 
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Politics 
Political issues Rogers' mentions include the lack of established, 
acceptable water quality standards balancing public and environmental 
health. Rogers' concern is that people's expectations for water quality are 
unrealistic and that attempting to satisfy these expectations is costly. This 
concern does not seem to apply to Basin water policy to date because 
pollution is not currently a problem. 
Rogers raises a concern about the maintenance and operations of 
water infrastructure. These should be federally coordinated and adequately 
funded, including costs of services as well as of structures, he claims. The 
infrastructure for Basin water is in variable condition. The five wells 
serving the cities of Burns and Hines are in good condition, and operations 
and maintenance are completely funded by user fees. Although a plan exists 
for strategies should draw-down become a problem, in the last twenty-two 
years there has been no evidence of overdrafts (Collins 1995). Structures for 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge water controls are in poor condition 
generally, with many control structures dating to the 1950s. Repairs are 
made as funding allows (Wallsworth 1995). Private irrigation structures are 
maintained according to individual budgets and preferences. Centralizing 
the water infrastructure of the Basin does not make sense and is not 
feasible. Federal control and monitoring of all local water infrastructure 
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throughout the nation would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. This 
strategy would also only increase subsidization of supplies, which 
contradicts other aspects of Rogers model that stipulate elimination of such 
subsidies. 
Rogers identifies many problems in interagency and 
intergovernmental relations. Rogers' believes there are too many 
organizations with over-lapping authority for development of good water 
policy. Jurisdictions involved in Basin water policy do not coincide 
geographically: the state-designated watershed does not coincide with the 
BLM's Burns District, and neither of these boundaries relate to those of 
either the national forests or refuges. Multiple agencies with different 
agendas and geographic extents sharing authority over the same resource 
can provide valuable balances and trade-offs. This has been demonstrated 
in the Basin through conflicts over grazing rights, water rights, allocations 
and use, and wildlife habitat and rangeland improvements (Barnard 1994; 
Cockle 1994; Cockle 1993; Durbin 1994; Hogan 1994; Wallsworth 1995; U. 
S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962). Perfect consistency, geographically and 
ideologically, may not be required for determining the best policy. 
The centralized administrative system that Rogers proposes is not 
likely to be feasible in the Basin. Centralization of administration does not 
guarantee agreement on issues. Further, Rogers does not model the 
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relationships between existing jurisdictions, state and federal, and the 
proposed regional problem-sheds and federal water council. It is possible 
that, even if increasing coherency and agreement on policy were desirable, 
applying his proposal in the Basin would only increase conflicts and 
bureaucracy. 
Objectives and Methods 
Rogers' objectives focus on economic and political reforms. He believes 
beneficiaries should pay complete water costs in a privatized system, 
organizational roles should be better defined, water policy should be set by a 
central water authority, and public education should increase awareness of 
issues. In Malheur Lake Basin, many beneficiaries and users of water 
resources develop and pay for water and related infrastructure themselves. 
Other uses are subsidized. A system of paying for complete costs of water 
might not be practicable, and might prove to be regressive, in the Basin. 
The resistance of local ranchers to decreased access to public lands for 
grazing and stock watering, and increased fees for such access, is one 
indication that eliminating subsidized uses is probably not feasible. The 
interest of environmentalists in bidding for grazing permits and the 
purchase of Borax Lake by the Nature Conservancy indicates that some 
wildlife preservation would occur under a privatized system. However, the 
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ability of this community to pay the complete costs of water and maintain 
the existing land uses and economy is questionable. 
Most agency roles are well-defined in the Basin. All federal agencies 
released management plans within the last five years. The state has not 
released a Basin-specific plan in thirty years, but has been active in water 
policy in other ways, such as in developing new drought policies and 
procedures and new ground water rules .. 
Rogers believes that centralization and coordination will improve 
interagency relations. The two federal agencies in the Basin that "get 
along", the USFS and the BLM, are under the Departments of Agriculture 
and Interior, respectively. The agencies that more typically conflict, the 
USFWS and the BLM, fall under the authority of one department, the 
Department of Interior. Clearly, centralization under a single federal 
authority does not guarantee improved coordination if other conflicts exist. 
In this case, conflicts apparently arise when jurisdictions overlap, especially 
geographically, regardless of whether agencies are accountable to a single 
authority. 
In the area of improving information and education, particularly 
directed towards adults, Rogers may have an objective that does not already 
exist in some form in the Basin and that is not contra-indicated. Education 
opportunities exist throughout the Basin, including sites for field 
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investigations and centers for dissemination of information. These 
opportunities include the wide variety of Natural Study Areas (under 
various jurisdictions), Wilderness Study Areas, Refuges, recreation areas, 
and others. However, no aggressive adult education campaign exists that 
might provide a means for bridging some of the gaps between ranching and 
wildlife values. Since Rogers is adverse to subsidies it is important to 
consider who would pay for such education and research programs. It is 
likely such an education program is an inconsistency in Rogers' model 
because it would probably require subsidies. Also, improving public 
education might not be conducive to the centralized water policy system 
Rogers seeks. Improved public education implies increased public 
participation, whereas Rogers seeks to decrease the numbers of parties 
involved in water policy. 
Rogers' methods include establishing meaningful administrative 
regions. Although the state-defined Basin boundaries do not coincide with 
the administrative boundaries established by federal authorities, it is 
nonetheless an arguably meaningful region, albeit one with uncertain 
boundaries. The physical landscape and political and cultural history make 
it a region with a recognized and distinctive character. Over time, the Basin 
has exhibited stability. The economy changes gradually. The conflicts that 
arise vary somewhat over time, but even these are based on many of the 
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same issues and concerns that have dominated conflicts since European 
settlement of the Basin. It is not clear that adding a problem-shed 
administration to the existing complex of jurisdictions would add meaning 
to the region. It is also not clear that it would be consistent with Rogers' 
goals of consolidating and centralizing water administration. 
CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
Developing theoretical and philosophical ideals for policy is relatively 
easy. It is more difficult to demonstrate how those ideals relate to actual 
circumstances and still more difficult to provide a useful framework for 
actual policy applications. Feldman and Rogers' models over-simplify actual 
policy concerns, overlook crucial circumstances, and are not feasible for 
application. 
Feldman's normative model assumes capitalism and 
environmentalism cannot coexist and overlooks historical facts contrary to 
this. There are examples that these ethics coexist in the Basin, though not 
without conflict. Feldman seeks social harmony through heightened 
pluralism. Yet, the Basin demonstrates that well-represented, strongly 
divergent interests lead to intense conflicts. Trade-offs are wrought through 
these conflicts, but the conflicts remain. Feldman seeks a broad-based 
environmental ethic and acceptance of natural variability and uncertainty. 
However, he does not explain how to achieve this acceptance, overlooking 
that people depend on predictable, consistent water supplies and that their 
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environment can consist of extremely variable conditions, such as those of 
the Basin. 
Rogers, assuming economics factors are primary in water policy, 
overlooks physical factors, which play a dominant role in water policy. As 
illustrated in the Basin, non-economic values and concerns are considered 
seriously in water policy development. Rogers also neglects treatment of 
flood and drought events, which are prominent concerns in the Basin. His 
recommendation of managing water entirely as a commodity does not offer 
any strategy for managing these physical phenomena. 
Both models propose a top-down approach to water policy and 
regional water administrations. Feldman proposes replacing state 
jurisdiction over water with watershed regions subject to a social contract. 
Feldman assumes that an environmental ethic can be widely established 
that would transcend differences and conflicts. Rogers' proposes problem-
sheds that overlay existing jurisdictions and are subject to a national water 
council. Rogers' assumes a federal leadership role that transcends local 
interests. Neither of these scenarios are supported by evidence from the 
circumstances in the Basin. Establishing either of the regional systems is 
not feasible given the existing intergovernmental and interagency relations 
of the Basin. Feldman's system would require replacing existing 
jurisdictions. Rogers' system does not clarify the relationship of his regional 
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administrations to existing jurisdictions. In the Basin, two broad interests, 
in agriculture and in wildlife habitat, have dominated water policy 
development since European settlement. Given the level of resistance to 
policy change, it is not clear that either replacing existing jurisdictions or 
overlaying additional jurisdictions would be accepted in the Basin. Further, 
neither model illustrates that its regions would be preferable to, or 
particularly different from, existing states. 
Feldman and Rogers are concerned with establishing an accepted 
national agenda for water. Feldman seeks increased pluralism and public 
participation in water policy; however, he prioritizes establishing a 
nationally-held environmental ethic and a social contract of decision-
making rules. In Rogers' case, public education is suggested to increase 
awareness and agreement on a variety of water policy issues. He seeks to 
manage water coherently through a federal water council and national 
water policy. It is not feasible to establish such national agendas in the 
Basin because of state water law. Further, it is not clear that decreased 
conflict would be necessarily preferable in the Basin. Conflicts between 
interests in agriculture and in wildlife habitat seem to have led to policy 
trade-offs and stability in the Basin over time. 
The fundamental disagreement between interests in preserving 
wildlife and in preserving the ranching lifestyle is not likely to be resolved 
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by a national agenda. These two interests can coexist, but water policy is 
often wrought through conflicts and trade-offs. Water policy is unlikely to be 
generated by getting everyone to believe an environmental ethic or to abide 
by federal decision. The Basin shows that this is true for agencies as well as 
individuals. Federal agencies exhibit tension in the Basin. The state 
periodically resists federal jurisdiction over federal lands and federally-held 
water rights. Local residents resist changes in federal or state public lands 
and water policies. 
While the Basin is unique in many ways, the issues and concerns 
present there can be generalized to other locations. In particular, the 
conflicts between agricultural and environmental values and the difficulties 
with variable water supplies are circumstances that occur in many areas. 
These are precisely the issues that the models do not accurately represent. 
Neither model offers a framework adequate for considering natural factors 
and physical variability of water supplies. However, in the Basin, natural 
factors are a crucial water policy concern. Also significantly, neither of the 
regional systems of water administration recommended by the models is 
applicable to the Basin. It is doubtful, therefore, that the models would 
provide useful frameworks in other locations. 
These two models do not provide sufficient frameworks for Basin 
water policy applications because they do not adequately account for and 
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reflect the circumstances of the Basin. While models are necessarily 
simplifications, the models considered herein suffer from extreme over-
simplification. Model development is not necessarily a useless endeavor. 
Ideally, models can provide applicable frameworks. However, in order to 
provide useful frameworks for water policy applications, model developers 
must closely consider the circumstances of actual water policy cases, rather 
than idealize and debate theoretical and philosophical issues. 
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